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As weapon systems have become more complex and costly, the DoD has 
explored a variety of methods to decrease the acquisition cycle, reduce costs, and 
enhance performance of the systems acquired. Current DoD initiatives have 
focused upon reducing the Government unique specifications and activities that are 
not cost effective. This has lead to a reexamination of Government policies and 
practices regarding oversight of contractors. This philosophical shift toward a 
more team oriented approach to major weapon systems acquisition has caused a 
change in the management techniques used by the Government, and consequently, 
has impacted the. structure and relationships between the Government 
organizations responsible for monitoring and controlling contract performance. 
This thesis develops a continuum of organizational models based upon the level of 
control the Government desires in managing a weapon system program. The need 
for control is based upon the confidence and trust placed in the contractor's 
capabilities and motivations. The U.S. Marine Corps Advanced Amphibious 
Assault Vehicle program is then analyzed in terms of the continuum to develop a 
generic model of the types of organizational structure and inter-organizational 
agreements needed to promote a culture of partnership between industry and the 
various Government agencies that are responsible for contract management. 
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The Federal Acquisition System is designed to deliver the best value products to 
customers while maintaining the public's trust and fulfilling public policy objectives. The goals of 
the system include: ensuring timely delivery, reasonable cost and high quality; reducing 
administrative costs; and conducting business with integrity, fairness, and openness. [Ref I :sec. 
1.102] 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR.) states that fulfilling these goals and objectives 
is accomplished by the Acquisition Team. The team is made up of representatives from technical, 
supply, and procurement communities, their customers, and the contractors who provide the 
goods and services. [Ref l:sec. 1.102] 
For Department ofDefense (DoD) acquisitions, this team includes the Service program 
manager (PM) as the user's representative, the Defense Contract Audit Agency which audits 
contractor's book and records for negotiations and payments, the Defense Contract Management 
Command which provides administrative support, technical evaluations, and surveillance of the 
contractor, and the contractor. 
As weapon systems have become more complex and costly, the DoD has explored a 
variety of methods to decrease the acquisition cycle, reduce costs, and enhance the performance 
of the systems acquired. Currently, reform initiatives have focused on reducing Government 
unique specifications and activities that are not cost effective. The Secretary ofDefense in his 
memo Acquisition Reform: A Mandate for Change stated, "We must shift from an environment of 
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regulation and_ enforcement to one of incentivized performance [Ref 2]." This change in 
approach to managing acquisition will make the contractor a more equal partner in the process. 
The change in philosophy regarding acquisition management may lead to significant 
changes in the structure and roles of those organizations which perform contract administration 
tasks. The reform initiatives have encouraged PMs and Program Executive Officers to be 
· innovative in planning and executing their programs. One initiative has been to collocate the 
program management office (PMO) with the contractor. The belief is that close communication 
and teamwork between the user's representative and contractor will facilitate the delivery of high 
quality systems on time and on budget. 
DCMC has fulfilled the role of Government on-site presence at contractor facilities since 
its formation in 1990, through its in-plant and geographic area field offices. DCMC's mission is: 
"to provide worldwide CAS in support of DoD components, NASA, and other federal and 
international organizations [Ref 3:p. 2]." 
Although presenting an opportunity for several benefits, collocation of a PMO in a 
contractor's facility presents the potential for conflict, redundancy, and confusion. Careful 
coordination and teamwork is required to maintain the Government's single-face-to-industry 
concept. Under this organizational arrangement, the traditional roles of the PM and DCMC will 
need to be redefined. The U. S. Marine Corps Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAA V) 
program is collocated with the system prime contractor, General Dynamics Amphibious Systems 
and is currently establishing an agreement with DCMC on integration of a Program Support Team 
(PST) into the facility. 
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The AAA V program was approved for entry into the Program Definition and Risk 
Reduction (PDRR) phase of the acquisition cycle in March of 1995. Two contractors had been 
involved in the Concept Exploration (CE) phase. The acquisition strategy calls for a 'down select' 
to one contractor, who will be the sole source for all phases through Production, 
Fielding/Deployment and Operational Support. The PDRR award was made in June 1996. 
The AAA V program office used Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) in several areas during 
CE. The PM believes that a close relationship with the contractor through the IPT concept is a 
key to the success of the program. To further enhance teaming, the contractor and program 
office moved into a common facility in September 1996. 
In the process of developing the PMO structure that would collocate with the contractor, 
the AAA V Program Manager was made aware of an opportunity to create a PST structure using 
DCMC resources. [Ref 3] This team would work in the PMO and provide expertise in a variety 
of technical areas in addition to their traditional contract administration and contractor 
surveillance functions. 
During the defense drawdown, DCMC has restructured and sought opportunities to 
provide a broader range of services to their customers. In his first newsletter, Major General 
Drewes, the DCMC Commander, listed his Top Ten Challenges. [Ref 3:p. 8] Providing 
substantive Early Contract Administration Services (EarlyCAS) and Integrated Process Team 
participation headed the list. DCMC has had substantial experience in integrated teams from its 
Process Oriented Contract Administration Services (PROCAS). PROCAS involves forming 
cross-functional teams with a contractor to review critical business and manufacturing processes. 
The goal is to reduce the level of oversight required to protect the Government's interests. 
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DCMC's approach to providing this support is to open discussions with the PMs to get 
them to identify the types and kinds ofDCMC services that they might need, in an unconstrained 
environment. The next step is to then develop a critical personnel requirements list for a PST. 
This PST then acts as an integral part of the PM's staff 
DRPM AAA V has identified areas of support in software development, technical cost 
estimation support, engineering surveillance and normal contract administration services. After 
initial meetings in February 1996, a strawman PST was proposed for phasing into the PM's office 
and various IPTs. DCMC and DRPM AAA V are currently developing an operating agreement 
for PST support. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
This study describes the traditional assignment of responsibility for contract administration 
tasks and develops several different models for managing contract performance. An analysis of 
the decisions regarding organizational structure and interorganizational agreements between 
DRPM AAA V, DCMC and the Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) will be 
made. Analysis of these decisions will be used to identify key issues in implementing a teaming 
arrangement for major weapon system acquisitions. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is: Can a general model for implementing a Defense 
Contract Management Command structure into a program management office be developed from 
an analysis of the management decisions made in developing the Advanced Assault Amphibian 
Vehicle Program ManagementOffice? The subsidiary questions are as follows: 
1. What were DRPM AAA V' s principal objectives in developing the Program 
Management Office team, and to what extent were they achieved? 
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2. How were Integrated Product Team concepts incorporated into the development of the 
integrated Program Office team? 
3. What obstacles had to be addressed and overcome in developing the Program Office 
team? 
4. What unique participation ofDCMC resources were necessary in developing this 
Program Office team structure and what advantages and disadvantages did this have? 
5. What unique organizational agreements were necessary to aid development? 
6. What decisions and resources will be required to sustain the Program Office team in 
the long term? 
7. How will understanding the development of the AAA V PMO be used in organizing 
future weapon system program offices? 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
The scope of the thesis will be limited to a case study of the integration of a DCMC 
organization into the DRPM AAA V office. The study will explore the methods used and 
decisions made in integrating the DCMC Product Support Team and the AAA V Program 
Management Office. A review of the lessons learned will be used to develop a generic model of 
this type of arrangement for use by other program managers. This study was prepared as the 
organization of the PMO was being established and agreements with DCMC and 
MARCORSYSCOM were still being negotiated. This limits the study to a description and 
analysis of discrete decisions without the benefit of data on the results of these decisions. This 
study assumes that the reader commands a general knowledge or familiarity with Government 
contracting and program management. 
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E. METHOI)OLOGY 
To answer the primary and subsidiary questions, two research methods were employed. 
First, a comprehensive review of available literature dealing with program management, contract 
administration, and Integrated Product and Process Development was conducted. Research 
included a review of documentation related to the roles and functions ofDCMC, implementation 
guidance for IPPD, documentation from DRPM AAA V and DCMC Manassas and the DCMC 
headquarters at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Second, interviews with various personnel from the 
AAA V program office, DCMC headquarters and the field office in Manassas, Virginia were 
conducted. These interviews included General Drewes, the Commander DCMC, the AAA V PM, 
Deputy PM, contract manager, Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) and the program legal 
counsel. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
The research is organized in the following manner: Chapter I presented the background 
and research questions for the study. Chapter II contains a discussion of the various program 
office structures, a description of contract administration organization, and a general description 
of the IPPD concept. Chapter III introduces the traditional organization for contract 
administration employed by the Government, including the interorganizational agreements 
established by the PMO and Contract Administration Organization (CAO). Chapter IV discusses 
the rationale for the contract administration tasks and develops four alternate organizational 
structures for managing the acquisition of major weapon systems. Chapter V presents the 
background and current organizational structure of the DRPM AAA V PMO and their use ofiPTs 
to manage the AAA V program. Chapter VI provides conclusions derived from the research, and 
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recommendati_ons for future implementation of Government organizational teaming in major 





This chapter will focus on the environment in which major weapon systems are 
developed and procured. This environment includes: the program office organization, the 
contract administration organization (CAO) and the management concept oflntegrated 
Product and Process Development (IPPD). 
A program office is organized by a Program Manager (PM). PMs are responsible 
for acquiring a weapon system, subject to such constraints as cost, schedule, and 
performance. In attaining these goals the PM is responsible for defining the work to be 
done, the quantity of work, and schedules for work and funding. The organizational 
structure of the program office will have a significant impact on the ability of the PM to 
fulfill his charter. Current directives allow wide latitude to the PM in program structure 
and execution. Four organizational models of the program office will be discussed. 
Once a contract is awarded, the program office must then focus on monitoring and 
controlling contractor efforts, and where appropriate, directing changes. During contract 
performance the PM traditionally relies on a CAO. This office provides monitoring of 
both the contract and the contractor to ensure performance in accordance with the 
contract provisions. DCMC is chartered with providing this "in-plant" presence. 
The overall management concept ofiPPD, an approach to managing large, 
complex programs has been successfully used in industry for many years. In May of 1995, 
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Secretary pfDefense Perry mandated its used in DoD to the maximum extent practicable. 
[Ref 4] 
B. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION 
The majority ofliterature on program management identifies two categories of 
organizational structure, pure and matrix. [Ref S:p. 70] Within these two categories the 
literature further separates them into as few as two types and as many as five. It should be 
noted that these pure conceptual types will not be frequently found in practice, as 
individual circumstances may dictate a PM' s choice of structure. For the purposes of this 
discussion, four types are identified and their main characteristics described. 
1. Pure or Completely Projectized 
The pure program management structure is the simplest. It will also be the most 
familiar to individuals who are not accustomed to program management. The lines of 
authority and accountability are the same as those in a classical management structure. All 
personnel needed for the program are assigned to the PM. The PM has full control over 
all personnel assigned to work on the program. He is responsible for hiring, firing, 
performance evaluation, training and all other personnel administration. [Ref S:p. 68] 
The pure organization holds several advantages. The PM has the greatest amount 
of control over all program resources. [Ref S:p. 68] Because he directly controls all the 
functional areas supporting the program, communication both up and down in the 
organization is more efficient. [Ref 6:p. 118] This single line of authority also makes the 
organization capable of reacting rapidly in a changing situation. [Ref 6:p, 118] The 
organizational structure of the pure model is a classical hierarchy. Lines of authority and 
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comrnunic;:ttion are clear. The familiarity of the organization and relationships make it 
easier for individuals to adapt. Also, with everyone involved in program execution 
working for the same boss, it is easier to develop a sense of unity and purpose among the 
diverse functional areas. [Ref 6:p. 120] 
On the other hand there are some significant disadvantages to the pure program 
structure. The expense in personnel is a prime concern. The PM' s responsibilities for 
hiring and personnel administration take away from the time and resources he has to 
manage the program. It is difficult to find someone technically qualified to lead the 
program as well as possessing the skills needed to effectively manage the functional areas 
supporting the program. [Ref S:p. 69] Many individuals may be hired before they are 
needed or retained after their contribution to the program is finished. It may be difficult to 
attract the highest quality workforce because of concerns about future assignments after 
project completion. Lastly, if problems develop in program execution, the program is 
limited to the skills and experiences resident in the program office. [Ref 6:p. 120] 
2. Attachment or Task Force 
In this organization the PM exercises broad authority over all functional support 
to the program. The PM is responsible for the administrative support and evaluation of all 
support personnel assigned. He does not have the authority to hire or fire an individual; 
replacement of an unsatisfactory performer requires coordination with the supporting 
functional manager. The PM identifies requirements to the various functional managers 
for personnel. The functional managers then assign full-time support personnel to the PM. 
The PM maintains complete control of the work done by the functional areas to include 
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operating policies and procedures which may differ from the parent functional area. [Ref 
5 :pp. 75-76] A PM has the authority to direct support personnel assigned to deviate from 
the established policy or procedures of their functional area, if such action is in the 
interests of the program. 
The attachment approach avoids the necessity of the PM hiring and providing 
training for the various technical personnel. Even if the PM receives the functional 
support on a reimbursement basis, it will be less expensive. The phasing in and out of 
personnel to match the workload is much easier. The single line of authority still exists, 
making it possible to make decisions rapidly in a fluid environment. Because the PM 
maintains direct control over and evaluates all personnel, unity of purpose is maintained. 
[Ref. S:p. 76] 
The most significant disadvantage to the attachment structure is the difficulty in 
obtaining high quality support from the functional managers. Ifthe program-is expected 
to be of long duration, functional managers will be less likely to give up their "best and 
brightest" to the program. Additionally, highly skilled personnel may avoid being assigned 
to the program, if they perceive that the move will adversely affect their career path within 
their functional organization. [Ref 5:p. 76] _ 
3. Direct Support Matrix 
This organization is characterized by a small planning and control staff that works 
for the PM augmented by a matrix support structure.. This staff is responsible for defining 
the project in terms of schedules and tasks. Each functional area in the matrix 
organization provides dedicated support personnel to the program. The assigned 
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personnel may be either full-time or part-time. These personnel may physically reside 
either in the program office or in the functional area. The PM only controls the 
assignment of work; functional managers determine the policies and procedures under 
which the work is done.[Ref 7:p. 12.30] 
There are several advantages to the direct support model. Direct support is 
considerably less expensive than the forms previously discussed. Expense is reduced 
because personnel are assigned to a program when they are needed and reassigned as the 
workload drops off. The PM is not responsible for the bulk of personnel training and 
administration tasks and is better able to focus upon prograriunatic and coordination 
issues. The matrix form also lends itself to a higher degree of technical innovation because 
the assigned technical specialists are still "plugged-in" to the functional area and can draw 
on colleagues' expertise more readily in resolving issues. Worker motivation is higher 
because assignment to a project does not remove individuals from their functional 
department structure. It is also easier to match the personnel to a time phased workload. 
Management levels of the organization also gain better visibility of conflicts and can more 
readily resolve them. [Ref S:p. 73-74] 
The direct support matrix also has some significant disadvantages. First, the 
coordination and agreement between the program and supporting managers regarding 
policies, procedures and priorities can be time consuming and result in continuing conflict. 
The functional personnel report to two separate chains of command; this generates 
ambiguity and conflict. The goals of the functional departments and the program will 
probably not be congruent, resulting in potentially not meeting program support 
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requirements, Because this model relies heavily on multidimensional communication and 
consensus building between the PM and functional managers, the ability of the 
organization to adapt in a fast-paced, changeable environment is seriously impeded. [Ref. 
6:p. 127] 
4. General Support Matrix 
This model is similar to the direct support model in that the program staff is small. 
The PMO defines the work to be performed and requests functional area support. The 
level and type of support is then determined by the functional manager. There are no 
functional personnel dedicated 100 percent to the project. In its purest form, tasks from 
the program office flow to the next available person in the functional area. The functional 
manager exercises full autonomy over the policies, procedures and flow of work. [Ref. 
7:p. 12.30] 
This model provides the same advantages as the direct support model. The most 
significant impact is that the PM loses additional control and flexibility. This model will 
require a higher level of involvement by the organization's management above the 
program and functional managers. [Ref 5:p. 74-75] 
C. CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION ORGANIZATION 
Once the buying activity has awarded a contract, the assignment of contract 
administration is delegated to the DCMC. This delegation is required for all contracts 
which will be performed primarily in a contractor's facility. For contracts involving work 
on military istallations or various types of services these functions can be retained by the 
buying command. A list of the exceptions to delegation is found in the Defense Federal 
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Acquisitiop Regulation Supplement (DFARS). [Ref 8:sec. 242.203] When determined 
necessary by the PM, he can assign technical representatives to duties inside contractor's 
facilities. These technical representatives may conduct non-contract administration 
technical duties. [Ref 8:sec. 242.74] DCMC maintains field offices throughout the 
country and abroad in contractor plants. Area offices are established to provide contract 
administration services for contractors in a specified region. These offices may be located 
in a contractor facility, but service other contractors whose operations do not warrant a 
full-time presence. [Ref 9:pp. 6.1-6.6] 
There are four major goals in establishing a centralized contract administration 
organization within DoD: uniformity, economy of scale, professional standards and 
development, and an independent monitoring and reporting system in DoD. [Ref 10] 
Uniformity is a major concern· to defense contractors. At one time, each Service 
maintained separate contract administration offices. These offices interpreted laws and 
regulations differently or implemented regulations under vastly different policies. [Ref 
11 :p. 44] This forced contractors to develop multiple ways to accomplish identical tasks, 
incurring higher costs. Often confusion about which policy or regulation governed a 
particular contract put additional strain on the relationship between Government and 
industry. One study identified over 200 separate acceptance and delivery procedures a 
contractor was required to follow to satisfy his Government contracts. [Ref 10] 
DoD recognized that the overlapping tasks and responsibilities being performed by 
each of the Services' contract administration offices could be more efficiently 
accomplished by a smaller centralized workforce. This would reduce overall 
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administration costs through a reduction of manpower, equipment, and support resources. 
[Ref ll:p. 44] 
Professional standards and development could best be realized by centralizing the 
functional personnel. [Ref 10] A centralized organization has members who are exposed 
to a wide variety of working situations. Centralization will enhance the ability to share 
information on current practices and techniques. This type of workforce also makes it 
possible to provide more opportunities for formal training of personnel without losing the 
ability to· carry on vital functions. A central agency could identify and promulgate broad 
standards and policies governing the workforce. Additionally a larger agency would have 
the critical mass necessary to conduct the education, training, and support services 
necessary to produce a high quality workforce. Centralization created an organization 
providing career path opportunities, enhancing employee motivation and attracting better 
skilled workers. [Ref 1 0] 
Concern over the perceived waste and abuse in DoD procurement during the 
defense build-up of the 1980s led to reform of the procurement process to fix the 
problems. Poor planning and program control had not been evident to higher levels in 
DoD until huge overruns and schedule slippage. culminated in the termination of the Navy 
A-12 program. In the Air Force, the C-17 program developed serious program 
deficiencies that nearly caused its cancellation. [Ref 1 0] DoD realized a need for an 
"independent" review and assessment of program issues and progress to allow DoD 
insight into program problems while they could still be successfully managed. [Ref 10] 
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~le the staffing of a particular field office will vary with the type and number of 
contracts being administered, the general tasks and functions are similar. A field office 
will have Administrative Contracting Officers (ACOs), and a variety of technical 
specialists including: industrial specialists, engineers (mechanical, software, electrical), 
quality assurance, and cost analysts. [Ref 9:pp. 6.4-6.8] Additionally the Defense 
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) will have auditors assigned on either a permanent or 
itinerant basis. The auditors are independent of the DCMC structure, but for the purposes 
of this study, a CAO will include auditors unless specifically excluded. 
DCMC provides support through field offices and "in-plant" offices utilizing PSTs. 
These teams are made up of appropriate personnel to accomplish tasks related to contract 
administration, quality assurance, engineering, production and industrial resources, 
property management, finance, transportation, and program support. The team is led by a 
Program Integrator (PI). The PI becomes the focal point for communication between the 
program office and the PST. Technical specialists on the team are responsible for 
surveillance of the contractor, providing input on schedule performance and forecasts on 
completion of work. Additionally they will provide input for any proposed changes 
affecting their area of expertise. The PI collects information from each functional area and 
compiles a program status report for use by the PM in program control and by DCMC to 
fulfill their charter for independent oversight of programs. [Ref 12:pp. 3.11.1-4] 
CAOs have a dual role in the acquisition process. They manage current contracts 
and support PMs in both pre- and post-award requirements. Their other responsibility is 
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to conduct reviews and evaluations of a contractor's business systems. These systems 
generally impact all the work being accomplished by the contractor. [Ref 12:p. 3.11-3] 
This split focus often causes tension between the PM and CAO. The CAO must 
continuously balance specific program needs against all other programs and the 
contractor. Cooperation and understanding must be achieved between the two 
organizations. The delegation of functions to a CAO as required by the FAR and DFARS 
[Ref 1 :sec. 42.302; Ref 8:sec. 242.203] and any additions or deletions will be 
coordinated and established in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed by the PM 
and the local DCMC commander. [Ref 12:p. 3 .11-3] 
D. INTEGRATED PRODUCT AND PROCESS DEVELOPMENT 
In April of 1995, Secretary of Defense Perry issued a memorandum entitled 
'Acquisition Reform: A Mandate for Change'. [Ref 13] In that memorandum he 
charged the Department of Defense to reduce acquisition costs by reengineering the 
oversight process and eliminating those activities that are not necessary or cost effective. 
Secretary Perry further commissioned a process action team to develop: 
... a comprehensive plan to reengineer the oversight and review process for 
system acquisition, both in the Components and Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) to make it more effective and efficient while maintaining an 
appropriate Oversight and Review process. 
The Process Action Team report was accepted by the Under Secretary of Defense 
(Acquisition and Technology), and issued with a directive to immediately implement a 
management program for Oversight and Review that used the Integrated Product and 
Process Development (IPPD) concept and Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) to 
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fundament_ally change the role that OSD and Component staffs had played in overseeing 
acquisition programs. [Ref 2] 
In May of 1995, Secretary Perry issued a Memorandum entitled 'Use oflntegrated 
Product and Process Development and Integrated Product Teams in DoD Acquisition'. 
[Ref 4] In that memo he directed "a fundamental change in the way the Department 
acquires goods and services. The concepts ofiPPD and IPTs shall be applied throughout 
the acquisition process to the maximum extent practicable." [Ref 4] The following 
guidance was given in the memo: 
Perform as many acquisition functions as possible, including oversight and 
review, using IPTs, in a spirit of teamwork, with participants empowered 
and authorized to the maximum extent possible to make commitments for 
the organization or functional area they represent. Involve key personnel 
early, and encourage timely decision making. Promote flexible, tailored 
approaches to oversight and review based on mutual trust, while 
considering program size, risk, and complexity. 
1. Integrated Product And Process Development Defined 
DoD defines IPPD as: 
A management process that integrates all activities from the product 
concept through production/field support, using a multifunctional team, to 
simultaneously optimize the product and its manufacturing and sustainment 
processes to meet cost schedule and performance objectives. [Ref 14] 
IPPD is closely related to concurrent engineering, where interrelated tasks are 
accomplished simultaneously instead of sequentially. However, it goes beyond concurrent 
engineering, in that it includes all facets of business practice, not just the technical 
disciplines. IPPD has been used in diverse segments of industry, most notably the auto 
and electronics industries. [Ref 15] 
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IPPD breaks down barriers and enhances communication horizontally through 
organizations, linking functional areas at the lowest possible levels to prevent conflicts. 
The use of sound business practices and common sense decision making are vital to the 
success of IPPD. Because most organizations are structured along lines of functional 
hierarchy, cultural change is necessary for successful implementation ofiPPD. In essence, 
IPPD provides a formal structure and set of tenets that have been the goal of program 
management. The ten tenets of IPPD are included in the Appendix. [Ref 4] 
2. Integrated Product Teams Defined 
As a basic organizational element for implementing IPPD, IPTs function to 
facilitate decision making in a timely manner based upon recommendations and input from 
the entire team. Teams are usually formed around functional areas such as logistics, 
cost/performance, etc. Each IPT is made up of individuals from the functional disciplines 
and varying levels of the hierarchy appropriate to the functional area. These members 
must have the knowledge and authority to make decisions and commitments for the areas 
they represent. The key to successful IPTs is that information flows horizontally through 
an organization as opposed to vertically. In theory this will cause all potential conflicts 
between functions to be traded-off so that the product will be optimized. Also, because all 
issues should be identified early and addressed at the lowest appropriate level, decisions 
need no longer be continuously revisited unless new information is developed or a major 
change is indicated. 
There are six key principles in operating an IPT: [Ref 14] 
1. Open discussions with no secrets 
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-2. Qualified, empowered team members 
3. Consistent, success oriented, proactive participation 
4. Continuous 'up the line' communications 
5. Reasoned disagreement 
6. Issues raised and resolved early 
The PM, or contractor, will set up program IPTs for specific areas or issues. 
These teams will include program office personnel, representatives from the Services, 
contractors, subcontractors and users. These multidisciplinary teams work to manage 
program resources and risk, and to integrate Government and contractor efforts. 
Normally the leaders of these teams become members of the higher level teams, enhancing 
the information flow to key decision makers. [Ref 16] 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter has introduced the three main components of the weapon system 
acquisition environment: the PMO, the CAO and the IPPD management concept. An 
understanding of the structure and mission of the two organizations provides a baseline for 
discussion of the allocation of the responsibility for tasks that must be accomplished 
during contract performance. The system acquisition process is improved by the use of 
IPPD. Enhanced communication, early problem identification and resolution, and 
teamwork ensure the development and acquisition of weapon systems within cost and 
schedule objectives. 
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The next chapter will present the tasks performed in contract administration. The 
traditional organizational model used by the Government in contract management will be 
developed. 
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ill. TRADITIONAL CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will discuss three aspects of traditional contract administration: the 
organizational environment, the separate tasks involved in contract performance, and the 
working relationships and agreements between the organizations. 
The environment consists of the organizational structure of the PMO and CAO 
and their location relative to the facilities where the work is actually being performed. The 
traditional tasks of contract administration are derived from various sources: law, 
regulation, policy and common business practice. The working relationships between 
these organizations are defined by the conceptual approach of support to the PM and 
contractor oversight. The approach to contractor oversight currently used by DCMC is 
Process Oriented Contract Administration Services (PROCAS). PROCAS involves 
teaming with customers and contractors to improve production and management 
processes. Analysis, review, and support of programs is determined jointly by the CAO 
and PM. This agreement and the associated measures of effectiveness are formalized in a 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). 
B. ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
Geographical dispersion of the participants is a key feature in weapon system 
acquisition. This means that the contractual relationship relies heavily upon 
communication via telephone, electronic mail, and paper. These means are backed up by 
periodic visits to the contractor's facilities and conferences where the participants can 
build a sense of teamwork and deeper understanding of issues. The relationships between 
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the Govequnent and the contractor will be affected by how the Government organizations 
are structured and how they interact. 
1. Traditional Program Office 
The most common organization for a major weapon system program office is the 
matrix. The actual breakdown of personnel that work for the PM and those that are 
provided on a matrix support basis may vary significantly. In almost all cases, the PCO 
and the legal counsel will be matrix support. The main reason for this arrangement is to 
preserve a level of independence and detachment from programmatic issues. Being 
removed from the direct reporting chain of the PM helps to ensure that the PCO and legal 
counsel are free to provide sound, unbiased advice to the PM. The PCO is the only 
person authorized to obligate the Government to a contract, and so is chiefly responsible 
for ensuring that the appropriate rules, regulations and guidelines are followed in 
negotiating and executing a contract. Additional matrix support required by the PM may 
be either full-time or part-time personnel supplied by the systems command. 
Determination of the level of support is made by the functional area manager based upon 
projected workload and availability of personnel. 
The advantage to the Service of the matrix arrangement is the creation of a stable 
career path for functional specialists. The matrix is more economical for two reasons. 
First, the resources available are more fully utilized over time than under the pure program 
management form. Secondly the costs of hiring personnel in various geographic locations 
or moving them to different facilities is avoided. The disadvantage is that the PM might 
be out of touch with the current situation in the facility where work is being performed. 
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This detachment from the center of activity and reliance on more formal, less rich 
communication media, can cause significant problems for the PM in controlling and 
directing contractor effort. DCMC, in the form of a CAO, provides the "eyes and ears" 
for the PM in a contractor's plant. Additionally, the CAO acts as an information broker 
ensuring a high level of communication and understanding of program issues as they arise. 
2. Contract Administration Organization 
The typical CAO is located in or near the contractor's facilities. Depending upon 
the level and type of work performed by the contractor at a particular site, the CAO will 
be staffed with an ACO, auditors, quality assurance representatives, industrial specialists, 
engineers, cost/price analysts, and program integrators. These various functional 
personnel are organized into PSTs. These teams are staffed based upon a review of the 
contract to be administered and the letter of delegation from the PCO specifying the tasks 
to be accomplished by the CAO. The Federal Acquisition Regulation delineates 69 tasks 
normally delegated to the CAO and 11 tasks that may also be delegated. [Ref I :sec. 
42.302] The DFARS identifies an additional10 functions to be delegated to the CAO. 
The complexity of the work to be performed, the type of contract used, and any specific 
requests for support from the PM will also be used in determining the appropriate 
personnel assignment to a PST and whether they will be full-time or part-time support. 
[Ref 17] 
C. CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION TASKS 
Contract administration is much more complex than just a system for receiving 
items and paying for them. The tasks involved require the integration of technical events, 
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interest and behavior of the parties, and the compliance with specific contract provisions. 
Sound judgment is the key to good contract administration. There are six broad 
categories of contract management responsibility: [Ref 11 :p. 97] 
1. Monitoring and surveillance 
2. Reports and services to PM and contractor 
3. Reviews and audits of contractor's internal management systems 
4. Formal decisions and actions affecting contractors 
5. Direction, negotiation and agreements 
6. Program sensitive contract management functions 
Within these categories are various tasks and responsibilities to be fulfilled by the 
PMO, PCO, and CAO. Some of these overlap, others are exclusive to a particular 
organization. Table 3.1 presents the contract administration tasks that, in common 
practice, are shared responsibilities of two or more organizations. Many of these tasks 
have a distinct leader with others participating in some of the actions required to discharge 
the responsibility, while others have no clear leader but multiple participants. The latter 
are designated as being joint responsibilities. Table 3.2 depicts those tasks which most 
commonly are performed by only one organization. 
It should be noted that a majority of the activities in Table 3.2 assigned to the 
CAO apply to a contractor's overall management systems, not to a particular contract. 
There are two primary reasons for these system wide activities to be done by the CAO. 
First, negotiation of rates that apply to more than one contract would not be efficient for 
26 
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION TASK PROGRAM PROCURING 
MANAGEMENT CONTRACTING 
OFFICE OFFICER 
Conduct Post-Award Conference p p 
Review Contractor Maintenance, Logistics and p 
Safety Systems 
Ensure Appropriate Restrictive Markings by L 
Contractor 
Conduct Audits of Cost/Schedule Control p 
Systems Criteria 
Review Cost Performance Reports L 
Make Administrative Changes and Corrections p 
to Contract 
Process Change Orders L Authorize/Negotiate 
Initiate change 
Ensure Compliance with Contract provisions L p 
Process Deviations and Waivers L p 
Approve Authorize 
Ensure Notification 'IA W Limitation of Cost L p 
Clause Approve Additional Authorize 
Funding 
Terminate for Convenience/Default p p 
Termination Termination Decision 
Decision 
Review Proposals J J 
Approve Changes Authorize/Negotiate 
Changes 
Gather Pricing Data for Negotiations L 
Provide Adequate Funding for Contract L p 
Approve Funding Authorize Funding 
Monitor Production Status/Progress J 
Review Contractors Revised Estimate At J 
Completion, Work Plans, etc. 
Observe and Report on Contractor Tests of p 
items 
Process Requests for Government Property L p 
Evaluate/ Approve Authorize/Negotiate 
Manage non-Contract Use of Government J 
Property Approve Use 
Conduct Program Reviews for Configuration L 
Management, Data Management, Design and 
Production 
J= Joint Responsibility 
L= Lead Responsibility 
P= Participant in task 
Table 3.1 Shared Contract Administration Tasks 

































PROGRAM MANAGEMENT PROCURING CONTRACTING CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION 
OFFICE OFFICER ORGANIZATION 
Oversee Timely Submission of Review Requests for Advance Assign Responsibility for Supporting 
CDRLs Payment Contract Administration 
Identify Design and Development Negotiate Contract Price Administer Security Requirements 
Deficiencies Adjustments 
Conduct Engineering Reviews of Negotiate Final Pricing of Incentives Assist in Administration of Priorities 
Contractor Efforts and Allocations 
Evaluate and Make Negotiate Advance Agreements Monitor Contractor Industrial 
Recommendations on Contractor's Relations 
Engineering and Design Studies 
Review and Approve Requests to Execute Supplemental Agreements Conduct Contractor Purchasing 
Purchase or Fabricate Special Test System Reviews 
Equipment 
Review and Approve Subcontracts 
Release Shipments from Contractor 
Authorize Payment 
Assist Contractor in Obtaining 
Appropriate Tax Exemptions 
Issue Duty Free Certificates 
Administer Advance Payments; 
Maintain Special Bank Accounts 
Review Contractors Compensation 
Plan 
Verify Financial Condition of 
Contractor and Contract 
Verify Work Progress for Payment 
Conduct Reviews and Audit 
Contractor Insurance Plan 
Negotiate Forward Pricing Rate 
Agreements 
Negotiate Interim Billing Rates 
Negotiate Final Overhead Rates 
Issue Notice to Disallow Costs 
Determine Adequacy of Contractor's 
CAS Disclosure Statement 
Determine Contractor's Compliance 
with Disclosed CAS Practices 
Review Statements on Status of 
Progress Payments 
Submit Progress Reports on Activity, 
Potential or Actual Delays 
Review Contractor Practices for 
Preservation, Packaging and Packing 
Screen, Redistribute and Dispose of 
Residual Inventory 
Review Contractor's Property 
Accounting System 
Negotiate Settlement of Handling 
and Moving Excess Government 
Property by Contractor 
Negotiate Adjustments from Revised 
Shipping Instructions 
Table 3.2 Contract Administration Tasks 
Source: Developed by Researcher 
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either the (iovernment or contractor. The contractor would incur a great deal of 
additional cost in negotiating rates for indirect labor and general and administrative 
expenses for each contract. These costs would be passed on to customers. The 
Government benefits by negotiating rates across all contracts eliminating duplication of 
effort and avoiding protracted negotiations on individual contracts over indirect rates. 
Second, the standards of audit and review of systems would be as varied as the number of 
DoD agencies doing business with the contractor. Consolidating these audits ensures that 
uniform practices and procedures are applied to the contractor's systems and the 
frequency of audits is reduced. The coordination and integration of these is facilitated by 
negotiated MOAs and the PROCAS concept. 
D. WORKING RELATIONSHIPS AND AGREEMENTS 
1. Memorandum of Understanding 
The CAO must simultaneously accomplish two roles as it administers contracts. 
The first is to operate as the communications conduit between the PM and contractor. It 
accomplishes this mission by being the PM' s "eyes and ears" in plant and acting as an 
information broker. The specific actions performed and products and services delivered 
by the CAO are jointly developed with the PMO when contract administration 
responsibility is delegated. 
Upon receipt of the contract and letter of delegation, the CAO reviews the 
contract requirements and determines what functional specialists may be appropriate to 
support the PMO during performance. Each of the identified team members then reviews 
the applicable portion of the contract to familiarize themselves with the PM' s goals and 
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objectives, They will then contact the PM' s functional representative to establish 
communications. These discussions allow the CAO personnel an opportunity to gain 
insight into specific goals and to determine the level and type of support required. This 
may include reports, reviews, or inspections of particular work efforts. 
After the various functional area representatives have coordinated efforts with the 
PMO, the PI will consolidate the support requests. The level and type of support is then 
translated into specific activities to be performed by CAO personnel. Depending upon the 
workload, personnel will be assigned full-time or on an as required basis to the PST. The 
support plan will include: key surveillance events, processes, products, the identification 
of measurement points, and activity schedules. During negotiation of the final MOA, a 
series of evaluation metrics will be developed. These metrics will be used by the PMO to 
evaluate the performance of delegated tasks. These evaluations will occur periodically and 
will provide the basis for improving CAO services and updating the MOA. [Ref 18:Pt. 
8] 
2. Process Oriented Contract Administration Services 
The CAO's second role is to provide assurance that the Government's interests are 
being protected in its dealings with the contractor. Over the years this has been 
accomplished through various laws and regulations requiring the contractor to open his 
financial records, cost and pricing information, and other business systems (purchasing, 
estimating, accounting) to audit and review. Additionally, a high degree of testing and 
inspection was done to ensure that products conformed to specifications. 
30 
In an effort to provide adequate oversight of contractors, ensure best possible 
price/cost analysis, and support PMO needs, DCMC instituted PROCAS. PROCAS 
focuses upon the analysis and continuous improvement of selected contractor and contract 
administration processes. [Ref 18:Pt. 2] 
Implementation ofPROCAS is accomplished by forming cross-functional teams 
with the military customer and contractor. These teams then identify critical processes 
that will provide opportunities for continuous improvement. Contractor participation on 
teams is voluntary. In the event the contractor does not wish to participate, the CAO will 
continue PROCAS initiatives with the customer. 
The goal ofPROCAS is to extend or eliminate audits and reviews, saving time and 
money for the Government. Real measurable evidence that the Government's interests are 
not being compromised is required. The PROCAS system establishes metrics for 
assessing process improvements. For example, in one MOA, the DCMC field office is 
graded on the effectiveness of contract administration. The specific criteria used are: 
- timely payment certification 
- effective quality assurance and engineering support 
- Government property administration _ 
- effectiveness in ensuring safety requirements are met 
For each area, DCMC personnel were evaluated on a scale of one to ten ( 1 = far short of 
expectations; 10= greatly exceeds expectations). Scores below five require a written 
narrative describing the nature of the deficiency. Each criteria score is then summed for a 
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total grad~ in administration. Normally, the PCO is responsible for completing the 
evaluation. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter has addressed the traditional approach to accomplishing contract 
administration. The traditional model is characterized by the structure of the PMO and 
CAO. The relationship between these organizations is defined by the application of 
PROCAS concepts in surveillance of contractor efforts and the MOA developed between 
the PMO and CAO. PROCAS allows the CAO to apply cross-functional teams, 
representing key stakeholders, to the job of gaining insight and control over contractor 
and contract administration tasks to continuously improve performance and reduce 
oversight. The MOA provides a framework for communicating the program goals and 
objectives to the CAO and measuring the CAO's effectiveness in supporting those goals. 
The next chapter will present a continuum of contract administration 
organizations. The individual contract administration models use differing methods to 
ensure contract performance. The confidence that the Government has in the capabilities 
of a particular contractor and the trust in the contractor's values, goals, and objectives will 
determine the contract administration tasks the_ Government performs and the methods 
used to accomplish them. 
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IV. ~TERNATIVE CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION ORGANIZATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the contract administration tasks will be described in the context of 
the six categories developed by Sherman. [Ref 12:p. 97] These six categories will be 
related to the fundamental goals of contract management. From this discussion of 
functional categories and their underlying rationale, alternative organizational models will 
be introduced and analyzed to determine if a more effective model of contract 
administration can be developed. The characteristics, underlying assumptions, advantages 
and disadvantages for each alternative organizational model will be analyzed. 
Successful acquisition depends upon close attention to performance. [Ref 12:p. 
2] The contract administration system and related tasks described in Chapter III represent 
the traditional approach to managing performance. This system emphasizes the 
independent interests of the parties to the contract and the conflicts that often arise from 
these differing goals and motivations. Additionally, Government concerns for promoting 
competition, small business participation, and other socio-economic policies influence the 
amount of control and input the Government has in a contractor's business decisions. The 
Government has a responsibility to the taxpayer for the expenditure of funds and so is 
interested in the costs incurred by contractors and how they are allocated to defense 
contracts. The focus on cost is necessary because competitive market forces do not 
always operate effectively in the acquisition of major weapon systems where there is only 
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one buyer.and few sellers. The contract administration tasks in Chapter III represent the 
Government's method of dealing with this environment. 
Generally, the goal of contract administration is to ensure that the contracted work 
is understood and that the contractor is making progress that will result in timely 
completion as established in the contract. Because the work effort is initiated by the 
contract, as opposed to buying off-the-shelf, the Government specifies or controls many 
aspects of the work effort. Often, in development projects, many unforeseen difficulties 
arise that require additional resources or innovative solutions. These issues are referred to 
as "unknown-unknowns" within program management organizations. These "unknown-
unknowns" heighten the need for communication and mutual understanding beyond the 
initial agreement. 
B. CATEGORIES OF CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION 
The existence of uncertainty and risk in performance, as well as the complexity of 
major weapon systems, motivates the Government to measure and assess contract work 
performance and progress. In some performance areas, the Government acts as an 
observer of the contractor's actions, giving rise to the monitoring and surveillance tasks. 
For other areas, the Government requires the contractor to measure, evaluate, and report 
progress. When this is the case, the Government will be interested in the contractor's 
internal management processes and capabilities. The result is numerous tasks related to 
review and audit of the contractor's management systems. 
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Th_e contract sets forth the general agreement between the two parties on goals 
and objectives. It cannot lay out the definitive solution to every conceivable problem, 
rather it lays the foundation for the processes to resolve issues and negotiate differences. 
Just as marriage vows set forth a general agreement between individuals but lack the 
specific steps to resolve conflicts over a burnt dinner or missed anniversary, the contract 
provides only the framework of the relationship; the contract management organizations 
working together flesh out and refine the relationship by their daily actions and decisions. 
In a sense, the relationship is not fully defined until the objective of the agreement is 
achieved. Skillful use of the tasks in each of these categories may well determine whether 
the relationship ends with irreconcilable differences or with successful attainment of both 
parties' goals. As discussed in the previous chapter, Sherman breaks down the contract 
administration tasks into six categories. Table 4.1 shows the distribution of the tasks 
developed by the researcher froni Tables 3.1 and 3.2. 
The first category, Monitoring and Surveillance functions, relates to the gathering 
of information. [Ref 12:p. 97] Many ofthese functions are central to the CAO's 
fulfillment of their mission as the "eyes and ears" of a program manager. This area 
focuses on three parts of the contractor's operation: management systems (e.g., 
Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria), manufacturing and technical processes, and the 
operating environment (e.g., Industrial relations). The surveillance of management systems 
is directed at monitoring compliance with DoD or contractual Cost Performance 
Measurement requirements. [Ref 12:p. 98] 
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MONITORING AND SURVEILLANCE 
- Post award conference 
- Ensure appropriate restrictive markings 
- Administer security requirements 
- Monitor contractor Industrial relations 
- Monitor compliance with contract provisions 
- Ensure notification lAW limitations of cost clause 
- Monitor production status/progress 
- Identify design and development deficiencies 
-Verify contractor production process is producing conforming items 
- Conduct inspection of end items 
- Observe contractor tests of items 
REPORTS AND SERVICES TO PM AND CONTRACTOR 
- Oversee timely submission of Contract Data Requirement Lists 
-Provide technical and administrative review of Value Engineering Change Proposals 
- Assist contractor in obtaining appropriate tax exemptions 
- Issue duty free certificates 
- Assist with Priorities and Allocations (DPAS) 
- Administer advance payment, maintain special bank accounts 
- Review contractor proposals 
- Gather pricing data for negotiations 
- Conduct engineering reviews of contractor proposals 
- Observe and report deficiencies in specifications or technical documentation 
- Evaluate and make recommendations on contractor engineering or 
design studies, Engineering Change Proposals, etc. 
- Evaluate contractor requests for deviation and waivers 
- Submit progress reports on activity, potential or actual delay 
REVIEW AND AUDIT OF CONTRACTOR INTERNAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 
- Review contractor maintenance, logistics and safety program 
- Conduct contractor purchasing system review 
- Conduct audit of contractor budgeting, scheduling, and accounting systems 
-Verify financial condition of contractor and contract 
- Verify work progress for payment to contractor 
- Review requests for advance payment 
- Conduct review and audit of contractor insU.rance practice 
- Review statements on status of progress payments 
- Review contractors revised estimates for cost at completion, work plans, etc. 
-Conduct reviews of contractor's data management, configuration management, design 
and production systems 
-Assess contractors Value engineering program 
- Review contractors practices for preservation, packaging and packing 
-Review contractor's property accounting system 
Table 4.1 Categories Of Contract Administration Tasks 
Source: Sherman and researcher interviews 
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-------------------------------------, 
FORMAL DECISIONS AND ACTIONS AFFECTING CONTRACTORS 
- Review and approve contractor subcontracts 
- Release shipments from contractor 
- Determine final overhead rates 
- Issue notice to disallow costs 
- Determine adequacy of contractor Cost Accounting Standards disclosure statement 
- Determine contractor compliance with disclosure statement 
- Screen, redistribute and dispose of residual property 
- Process requests for Government Property 
- Authorize non-contractual use of Government Property, collect rental fees 
DIRECTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS 
-Make administrative changes to contract (corrections) 
- Negotiate Forward Pricing Rate Agreements 
- Negotiate Interim Billing Rates 
- Negotiate contract price adjustments 
- Negotiate final pricing of incentives 
- Negotiate advance agreements 
- Execute supplemental agreements 
- Negotiate settlements of terminations 
- Negotiate settlements of handling and moving excess Government property by contractor 
- Negotiate adjustments from revised shipping instructions 
PROGRAM SENSITIVE CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION FUNCTIONS 
- Oversee timely submission of CDRLs 
- Review Cost Performance Reports 
- Ensure compliance with contract provisions 
- Ensure notification lAW Limitations of Cost Clause 
- Review proposals 
- Process and evaluate changes 
- Monitor production status/progress 
- Identify design and development deficiencies 
- Conduct engineering reviews of contractor proposals 
- Evaluate and approve recommendations on contractor engineering and design studies 
- Evaluate and approve contractor requests fer deviations and waivers 
- Review contractors revised estimates of cost at completion, work plans, etc. 
- Conduct reviews of contractor data management, configuration management, design 
and production systems 
- Conduct inspection and test of end items 
- Observe and report on contractor tests of items 
- Process requests for Government property 
- Review and approve request for purchase or fabrication of special test equipment 
Table 4.1 Categories Of Contract Administration Tasks continued 
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Tpe second category is Reports and Services. This consists of supporting 
administration in the form of analyses, evaluations, recommendations and reports. [Ref 
12:p. 97] These services are designed to provide insight and recommendations to a PMO 
that may not have the resident expertise to fully analyze an issue. Additionally, by 
reviewing technical direction from Government and feedback from the contractor, the 
CAO is able to identify and track deficiencies in design or development as well as potential 
delays. Services provided to the contractor include Defense Priorities and Allocations 
System ratings to obtain critical resources, tax exemptions, and duty free certificates. 
Sherman's third category, Reviews and Audits, is generally conducted on a 
system-wide basis. Favorable results of these audits often result in less oversight of the 
contractor by the Government. Unfavorable findings may result in additional oversight 
controls being implemented to protect the Government's interests. [Ref 12:pp. 97-98] 
The DCMC PROCAS initiatives have focused on these areas. The result has been an up-
front tailoring of audits to key measurement points for system validation. [Ref 19] 
The next category, Decisions and Actions, often has adverse affects on the 
contractor. [Ref 12:p. 97] Examples of this would be: determination of non-compliance 
with Cost Accounting Standards disclosure statements, or non-allowability of costs. 
These actions may also redirect the contractor's efforts through changes and 
modifications. In the exercise of the related tasks, there is a potential for adversarial 
relations to develop. Claims for price adjustment due to changes as well as challenges on 
allowability of costs may have to be resolved under the contract disputes clause. This 
tends to complicate the contract relationship, as an outside party becomes involved in 
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resolving the issue either through alternate dispute resolution, contract review board 
hearings, or litigation. 
Sherman's fifth category is Directions, Negotiations, and Agreements; it involves 
the transactional nature of the contract relationship. The focus is on the interaction 
between the Government and contractor to resolve problems, to redirect effort, or to 
settle claims. [Ref 12:p. 97] Often a 'win-lose' attitude taken by the parties makes these 
interactions divisive. The successful accomplishment of these tasks takes not only the 
individual skills of those involved, but a full knowledge of the background and context of 
the issue, including an understanding of the interests and motivations of the other party. 
The complexity of the project and the phase of the acquisition will determine what 
functions are Program Sensitive, Sherman's final category. They can, however, be 
broadly described as those functions that provide information and analysis. Typically, 
tasks dealing with changes, technical evaluation, and funding determined to have the 
greatest potential impact on cost, schedule and performance will be included in this 
category. [Ref 12:p. 98] Whether developed from inside or outside the PMO, they are 
critical to decisions by the PM regarding direction to the contractor or the allocation of 
resources to manage program risk. 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS 
The traditional contract model described in Chapter III is based upon an 
assumption of conflicting motivations and objectives for each party entering a contractual 
relationship. Because of this, the majority of contract administration tasks involve the 
actions taken by the Government to protect its interests. This section will present four 
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organizational models along a continuum. Movement along the continuum is based upon 
who has primary control of contract performance. The need or desire for control is a 
function of the confidence and trust between the parties and their ability to interact during 
contract performance. This continuum is depicted in Figure 4 .1. The Arsenal Model 
represents the highest level of Government control of the acquisition process, because the 
Directive Traditional Partnership 
Model Model Model 
Arsenal 
Model 
Control- Overs1ght Ins1ght- Trust 
Figure 4.1 Contract Administration Continuum 
Source: Developed by Researcher 
Transactional 
Model 
Government is responsible for all aspects of development and production of the system. 
The Government exercises somewhat less control in the Directive Model. A commercial 
contractor performs the work, subject to intense Government inspection and verification 
of processes and products. The Partnership Model relies upon teamwork and 
interdependence between the Government and contractor. Government control is 
exercised through understanding of contractor goals and motivations. The Transactional 
Model places full control of contract performance on the contractor. The underlying 
assumption is that the Government's best interests are served by allowing the contractor 
to exercise his best judgment in contract execution. 
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C~mtractors have complained that oversight performed by the Government 
imposes costs that far outstrip any benefit to the public. One study of the defense industry 
estimated an average cost premium of 18 percent attributable to Government oversight 
and regulation. [Ref 20] Some contractors have stated that the need for approval and 
verification of management systems and processes adversely affects the contractor's 
flexibility in addressing program issues and taking advantage of innovation. Each of the 
four models addresses the issues of cost effectiveness and responsiveness, but in different 
ways. The underlying assumptions behind these organizations also varies. The 
characteristics of each model will be presented, followed by an assessment of advantages 
and disadvantages. 
1. Arsenal Model 
a. Discussion 
An Arsenal Model is defined as the Government exercising total control 
over the development and production of a weapon system. The development and 
production of weapon systems using an Arsenal Model would have a major impact on 
acquisition organizations. The Government in this environment is both buyer and seller. 
Presumably, both sides share identical values, .goals, and objectives. Because the arsenal 
does not operate on a profit motive, and the data concerning costs are fully available to 
the buying agency, the level of skepticism and distrust that exists in dealing with 
commercial enterprises is not ·a factor. 
The relationship will not have all of the contract structure that would exist 
between two independent organizations. Some level of competition, either between 
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arsenals qr with private firms, would maintain a separation between the buying and selling 
organizations. This preserves the elements of a contract (offer, acceptance, consideration) 
and defines the agreement between the organizations. 
The Arsenal Model is different from a Government-Owned Contractor-
Operated (GOCO) facility. In a GOCO, the facilities and tools are provided by the 
Government, but a commercial organization (contractor) performs the work to a level 
defined in the contract. The GOCO contractor is motivated by profit, and exercises 
management control over the work and the personnel who perform it. This allows for an 
infusion of technical capability and innovation that is not available in the closed arsenal 
system. 
The requiring Service would develop an organization to define the scope of 
work, schedule, and resources available. The arsenal would provide the technical and 
management expertise required to complete the project. The arsenal would also project 
estimated costs to complete the contract. The verification and inspection of processes, 
and evaluation of changes normally done by a CAO in the Traditional Model would no 
longer be required. 
Performance measures and assessments would be accomplished by the 
arsenal. Identification of deficiencies and resolution of program risk and uncertainty 
would be joint responsibilities. Because the Government is solely responsible for all 
aspects of the project, either through the requiring activity or the arsenal, a field office to 
conduct administration tasks would not be required. 
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b. Contract Administration Tasks 
Under an Arsenal Model, many of the functional categories are no longer 
required or have a significantly reduced number of associated tasks. The Review and 
Audit functions would no longer be performed. The systems in-place to manage the 
contract are developed·by the Government. Also, Formal Decisions regarding the use or 
disposition of Government property or·compliance with Cost Accounting Standards 
would not be necessary. 
The tasks in the Monitoring and Surveillance category would be the 
responsibility of the arsenal (e.g., security requirements, restrictive markings). The 
Arsenal would also perform many of the Report and Service tasks. Although the Service 
would continue to review change proposals and provide input on trade-off decisions, the 
arsenal could perform the technical evaluations required. The arsenal could also obtain its 
own duty-free certificates and tax exemptions. 
Negotiation of agreements would encompass most of the tasks from the 
Traditional Model. Those areas dealing with advance agreements or cost allowability 
issues would not be required. The negotiations might be less intense than in the other 
models, since cost data are fully known by both parties and the arsenal does not operate 
on a profit basis. 
c.. Advantages 
Government manpower requirements for managing the program would be 
considerably lower in this model than the Traditional Model. The contract management 
tasks related to design, development, and production processes could be the responsibility 
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of the arsenal and might not require oversight. The ability to conduct investigations and 
audits to detect waste, fraud, or abuse could be performed by the Inspectors General and 
General Accounting Office. The buying activity would be responsible for the 
administrative tasks of corrections, administration of payment, and acceptance of the 
items. 
The Government would employ large numbers of technical experts and 
scientists. This coupled with the tooling and facilities would provide a great deal of 
flexibility in meeting material requirements. In the event of national emergency, 
Government facilities could immediately have their work efforts redirected to meet the 
most critical needs. While this might create a certain amount of waste and inefficiency, it 
would be much more effective than the process of terminating contracts and negotiating 
new work with commercial industry. 
Because the Government is solely responsible for all aspects of the project, 
either through the requiring activity or the arsenal, the redundancy of a field office to 
conduct administration tasks would not be required. This would allow technical experts 
employed by the Government to focus effort on development of technology and process 
improvements instead of monitoring and oversight. The Government would also save the 
costs associated with the support structure (e.g., facilities, equipment, training) offield 
offices. 
Finally, the Government would have full control over the subcontract and 
supplier relationships, gaining a stronger ability to pursue socio-economic policies. At the 
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arsenal level, the Government acts as employer, and as such it can determine the hiring 
goals and promotion processes to achieve the desired level of workforce diversity. 
d Disadvantages 
The use of an arsenal system removes all market forces from the process of 
acquiring weapon systems. The absence of competition eliminates one of the primary 
motivations for industry and workers to innovate. There are also no outside pressures to 
drive the arsenal to continually assess their efficiency and to strive to improve their 
processes. The arsenals, as highly specific Government industries, are isolated from the 
technologies being developed in commercial business and may lack the knowledge and 
expertise to adapt new technology to their work. Competition between arsenals might 
help to mitigate this disadvantage by motivating process improvement and efficiency, 
however, the cost of the competition might be perceived as wasteful by the general public. 
The Government may encounter difficulty in maintaining the breadth and 
depth of the technical and scientific disciplines required to develop and produce major 
weapon systems. The time between major new projects may lead to large numbers of 
underutilized personnel that do not have skills that are transferable to other projects. 
Although upgrades to current systems and preplanned improvements would maintain a 
base workload, it might not be sufficient to employ the numbers of technical personnel 
required for a major development project. 
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2 .. Directive Relationship Model 
a. Discussion 
The Directive Relationship Model is defined as the Government managing 
contract performance through mandated processes and procedures. This model closely 
resembles an employer-employee relationship. The Government gives guidance on work 
performance and then directly supervises its performance. This model would require a 
very large Government organization to manage acquisition of a weapon system. Although 
detailed specifications and process descriptions are not necessary for this model, it would 
not be uncommon to see detailed statements of work. This is accomplished through the 
inclusion of specifications and standards, written by the Government, regarding the end 
product and the process used to. develop, manage, and produce it. The Government 
would exercise greater control over configuration management, as well as making design 
specifications. 
The most effective organization for the Government would be a centralized 
buying agency. This agency would be responsible for all activities in acquiring a weapon 
system. A large number of technical specialists would be needed to maintain specifications 
to ensure that they accommodated the best technology available. In the contractor's 
facility, a significant number of technical representatives would be necessary to monitor 
compliance with and documentation of processes and procedures. These activities would 
need to be closely coordinated to efficiently control contractors. The central agency 
would take over the program management functions as well as the traditionally delegated 
functions. This structure would ensure a uniformity of program planning and execution. 
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This woqld facilitate the use of mandatory procedures and processes by the Government. 
A central organization having control of all functional and technical experts involved in the 
acquisition process could more effectively utilize personnel, moving them from project to 
project as required. Additionally, this structure would provide a vast source of knowledge 
and experience in resolving program issues. 
The PMO would no longer be required in the Directive Relationship 
Model. Each Service would identify and define their requirements and strategy guidelines 
for acquiring a system. The central buying agency would then develop and execute the 
acquisition plan, from solicitation to contract completion. The requiring activities would 
assume the responsibilities as program sponsor within DoD, as well as with outside 
agencies. 
The contractor would maintain responsibility for identifying deficiencies or 
trade-off issues. Analyses, recommendations, and decisions regarding trade-offs would be 
accomplished by the Government. Implementation of changes or trade-off decisions 
would also be specified by the Government. The contractor would be responsible for 
following the Government-determined processes; implementation would then be verified 
by the Government. 
b. Contract Administration Tasks 
The performance of all six of the categories of contract administration 
would continue to be required. The methods used in the areas of Monitoring and 
Surveillance, Reports and Services, and Review and Audit would change substantially. In 
the first area, inspection of items could grow to a 100% inspection to eliminate all defects. . 
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The verifj.cation of a contractor's processes might include stipulating the process to be 
used and verifying its implementation. The level of evaluation of reports and proposals 
generated by the contractor would also increase. Because the Government, not the 
contractor, maintains configuration control and process control, the technical assessment 
burden is borne solely by the Government. Reviews of contractor's financial condition 
and internal accounting and budgeting systems would increase in scope and frequency, to 
ensure that the Government's interests are protected. 
The tasks performed in rendering formal decisions and negotiating with the 
contractor would be like those performed in the Traditional Model. The Government 
would have a greater volume of reports, evaluations, and audits upon which to make 
decisions or to develop positions for negotiation. 
Program Sensitive functions would include all areas dealing with technical 
evaluations, control of configuration, and data management. Under the directive 
approach, the Government assumes a great deal of technical and management risk. This, 
in tum, could lead to additional controls and decisions that seek to avoid risk. 
c. Advantages 
In this model, the Government_ fully controls factors of supportability, as 
well as interoperability. These factors include such things as configuration management, 
logistics supportability, and current system compatibility. This ensures, through the 
Government's control, that the appropriate infrastructure exists to support the weapon 
system that is being acquired. 
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A directive relationship also allows the Government to create and maintain 
a highly skilled workforce to use in developing and maintaining specifications and 
standards found in the contract. The development of specifications and verification of 
their implementation by the contractor make it necessary to have large technical staffs, 
both in contractor's facilities, as well as large matrix organizations, supporting program 
managers. 
In this model, the Government can also closely scrutinize and control risk 
elements inherent in systems development and integration. Because of the Government's 
high level of control, the technical staff will have already analyzed specifications and 
processes. Possible risks will have been identified and methods to manage, or avoid, the 
risks will be developed. 
Another advantage for the Government in this model is the reduced risk of 
waste, fraud, and abuse. Because the Government's staff is closely involved in all aspects 
of the production, there are fewer opportunities for contractor employees to take 
advantage of the situation. The Government also controls the contractor's methods for 
allocating and controlling costs, including a continuous audit and review, making it 
virtually impossible for the contractor to enter fraudulent or erroneous data. 
Because the Government has developed so many of the specifications and 
developed management plans for the risks, they are not tied to one specific contractor. 
The technical staff of the Government can be used to work with a contractor of their 
choice to implement their processes and designs, eliminating the need for a contractor with 
experience in producing similar items. This would be most effectively used in times of 
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national emergency, when production must be increased, as well as in times of 
contractor/Government relationship problems. 
Finally, the Government specifies accounting rules and systems for the 
contractor's use in determining his costs. After implementing these systems, they are 
subject to periodic audits and inspections. The use of Government approved processes 
and the continual oversight of their use by the contractor increases the Government's 
confidence that cost data are accurate and complete. 
d Disadvantages 
The Directive Relationship Model also has some disadvantages. The 
Government requirements for management systems and specific processes make it cost 
prohibitive for many firms to enter the defense sector. For a commercial sector contractor 
to expand into the market would, in effect, require the use of two sets of business systems. 
Conversely, defense sector businesses will find it difficult to compete for commercial 
contracts because of the high costs they incur complying with Government system's 
criteria and reviews. 
There will be a substantial increase in administrative costs to perform 
Government contracts. Contractors will incur costs in implementing and documenting the 
systems. The Government will conduct periodic audits and reviews of the contractor's 
documentation, incurring manpower costs for staffs ofboth the Government and 
contractor. Any deficiencies or deviations from approved processes will require 
correction and follow-up audits. 
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Another significant disadvantage is the lack of encouragement for 
innovation. The tight controls placed on the contractor under this approach remove the 
incentives to innovate and improve processes. Additionally, the barriers between 
commercial and defense industries make it difficult to adapt management and 
technological innovations. 
Finally, this model conflicts with the current acquisition philosophy. The 
current view is that private industry has proven methods of developing and integrating 
systems. This system, with its focus on control of contractor effort, reduces the 
contractor's ability to adapt to technological change and management innovations. 
3. Partnership Model 
a. Discussion 
The Partnership Model is defined as the Government and the contractor 
working together to satisfy common and individual goals. The model has a 
complementary, interdependent structure. Each party relies on the specific skills and 
experience of the other for successful accomplishment of the contract goal. The 
Partnership Model is based upon a belief that the values, goals, and objectives of the 
parties to the contract do not have to be in conflict. The motivations for each party may 
be different, but are seen as complimentary or congruent. Further, for those goals and 
objectives that may appear to be in conflict, it is believed that a course of action can be 
arrived at that will mutually satisfy the parties. 
Arriving at mutually beneficial solutions for achieving individual goals, as 
well as for achieving the objective of the contract, requires in-depth knowledge and 
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understanding of the other party's position and motives. Ideally, this requirement is 
satisfied by collocating the Government and contractor. The use of shared databases and 
software management systems ensures complete knowledge by both parties. 
b. Contract Administration Tasks 
The organizations required to successfully implement a partnering 
approach to contract performance would be different from the Traditional Model. The 
functions of surveillance, audit and review are replaced by concurrent development of 
work plans, processes and performance measures within the team structure. The 
immediate access to information and communication throughout the partnership allows 
management decisions to be made based upon a clear understanding of issues, instead of 
verified compliance with imposed policies and processes. 
The Government organization entering into a partnership would have to 
include all necessary functional specialists under a unified authority structure. All 
functions of contract management that remained a Government responsibility would be 
accomplished by this single organization instead of the PMO-CAO structure that exists in 
the Traditional Model. Because the members of each IPT must be given the authority to 
act on behalf of their organization, the Government representatives all need to be 
accountable to a single authority. 
The contractor in an IPT environment would be responsible for developing 
the technical approach to contract performance as well as managing program costs. IPTs 
involved in development, production, and management processes should be led by 
contractor personnel, because the ultimate responsibility for performance rests with the 
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contractqr. Government IPT members must be able to communicate the position of the 
PM on issues involving trade-offs. Agreements made by the Government team member 
are not s~bjected to review and approval at higher levels. Decisions made are only 
revisited if changes in the situation or new information make it necessary. 
The Partnership Model performs contract administration tasks using vastly 
different methods than the other models presented. Many of the tasks from several of the 
of the categories are performed concurrently in an IPT. In some cases, the purpose of the 
task is fulfilled without a specific link to an action. 
The tasks accomplished in Monitoring and Surveillance of verification and 
inspection are reduced by jointly developed policies, processes, and procedures. The goal 
of the remaining tasks is not to ensure the other party's performance, but to identify what 
actions need to be taken or resources allocated by the Government to improve 
performance. Some Government services provided to the contractor would continue to be 
the Government's responsibility (e.g., obtaining duty-free certificates). Proposals, studies, 
and reports submitted by the contractor are developed, reviewed, and approved by the 
appropriate teams concurrently. 
Internal management systems would be adapted through the Government-
contractor teams. Ultimate decisions on budgeting, scheduling, and accounting systems 
would be the contractor's responsibility. Teams would identify the critical data points 
requiring measurement and the data evaluation criteria. Review, audit, and verification 
would then become a joint task between the Government and contractor. 
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The authority to make decisions would reside in the teams. Formal 
ratification by authorized Government officials would be required. Decisions about the 
adequacy or compliance of a contractor's system would no longer be required. 
Determination of compliance with Cost Accounting Standards, for example, would be 
replaced by team agreement that internally developed standards and processes were 
adequate to control the program and protect the interests of both parties. 
The tasks in the Directions, Negotiations, and Agreements category would 
still be accomplished. Some, however, would be collapsed into the team proposal-review 
process. For example, engineering change proposals, and their cost impact, would be 
evaluated and agreement made in the appropriate IPT. Other non-contract specific 
negotiations would continue to be performed in the traditional manner. 
The Program Sensitive area would potentially encompass all of the tasks 
being performed by teams. Because the partnership focuses on the responsibility that each 
party to the contract has in resolving issues, the PM needs to be aware of all internal and 
external environmental factors that could affect the program. 
c. Advantages 
A precondition to successful IPT implementation is open communication 
and shared access to all available data. This "real time" knowledge by both the 
Government and contractor make the decision making cycle shorter. The time an 
individual team spends resolving an issue will be longer, because the team members will 
have access to far more information than under other models. The concurrent resolution 
of problems will involve a wider variety of input. Once the decision is made at the team 
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level, the _process is much quicker. Because the decision process is parallel instead of 
sequential, the review and approval required at higher levels is streamlined. 
Bringing together the two parties face-to-face through collocation and 
frequent meetings will lead to a better understanding of each party's underlying motives 
and priorities. This deeper level of interaction and shared information builds trust between 
the parties, reducing the need to verify actions. 
Trust and teamwork are enhanced because the teams come together to 
develop standards for policies, procedures, and processes. This differs from the 
Transactional Model where no standards are implemented, and from the Directive Model 
where standardization is imposed by the Government. Standards internally developed by 
the personnel involved in the work increases the likelihood that they will be followed, 
reducing the need for oversight activities. Additionally, the teams that develop the 
procedures and processes are the same teams that will identify program problems and will 
be better able to determine if a particular set of circumstances warrant a deviation from the 
standard, or if the standard should be reviewed. 
Using teams and promoting communication early and throughout the 
organization reduces the likelihood offailures_due to poor planning or misunderstandings. 
In the event of a program failure, the IPT approach increases the chance that the issues 
will be resolved without resorting to litigation. The Government and contractor will have 
opened the lines of communication and established a relationship that lends itself to other 
forms of problem resolution such as arbitration and mediation. 
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d. Disadvantages 
Implementing a partnership through IPTs requires a high initial investment 
of resources. The costs of training, collocation, and time spent in developing team work 
may cause many managers to abandon this approach. The costs are prohibitive if the 
project is of short duration. In some instances, the cultural and philosophical changes 
required to successfully team may be difficult to achieve, requiring more expenditure of 
time and money. 
To permanently change the organization's focus toward operating in teams 
requires tremendous effort by upper and mid-level management. Studies suggest that 
some organizations take three to five years to fully embody the necessary cultural and 
philosophical changes. [Ref 22:p. 23] These changes require not only changing the 
perception of the other party, but also creating a willingness to delegate authority into the 
lower levels of the organization. This is especially difficult in the military setting due to 
the hierarchical chain of command. 
Over time in the organization, functional specialists may not be able to 
keep up with advancements in their functional area. If a member is continuously assigned 
to teams, exposure to a wide variety of tasks and innovations may not take place. Also, 
because the team becomes the "home" of the assigned technical and functional experts, 
they will be isolated from their colleagues, missing out on the opportunity to share 
knowledge and experience. 
In an IPT organized workplace, the opportunity for unethical practices, 
corruption, or conflicts of interest may be higher because of the close working 
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relationsQips developed between Government and contractor personnel. Even if actual 
cases of such behavior are no more common than under other organizational 
arrangements, it will be more difficult to avoid the perception of impropriety. If both the 
Government and contractor promote, within their organizations, a 'win-win' philosophy 
based upon teamwork and high moral standards, this risk can be effectively mitigated. A 
continuous emphasis on team oriented success through training, policy statements, and 
personal involvement of upper-level management are the keys to creating an ethical 
workforce, under this or any other organizational arrangement. 
4. Transactional Model 
a. Discussion 
The Transactional Model is defined as a discontinuous relationship that 
brings the Government and contractor together for the exchange of a product and 
payment. In its pure form, this model brings the Government and contractor together 
before award of the contract to ensure understanding and agreement on the scope of the 
work as well as a schedule for completion and delivery. A fixed-price or method of 
determining the amount to be paid for the work is also agreed upon. After both sides sign 
up to the contract, they go their separate ways until delivery. The parties refer to the 
contract for guidance and issue resolution. The relationship is purely transactional in 
nature. 
The Government organization required to manage acquisition in this 
environment is much simpler than the Traditional Model. Prior to award of the contract, a 
fairly large staff would be needed. This staff would consist of technical experts and 
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functional representatives from finance, legal, and contracting. They would be responsible 
for working with the users to define the requirement and prepare a solicitation. Their final 
task would be to conduct an assessment of each offer received and judge the technical 
merits and realism of both the management plan and associated costs. After award, the 
program management requirements would be minimal and most of the staff would be 
reassigned to other work. The remaining role of the program office would be to receive 
the deliverable items, process requests for payment, or approve changes. 
b. Contract Administration Tasks 
No contract administration organization, as it exists in the Traditional 
Model, would be needed. The presence of Goyernment personnel in the contractor's 
facility would not be required or desired. Because the Government would rely solely on 
the contractor to monitor his overall business environment and contract performance, no 
reviews or audits of business systems is necessary. Reports traditionally made to a buying 
command by the resident CAO identifying deficiencies in specifications or technical 
documentation, potential or actual delays, and submission of Contract Data Requirements 
Lists (CDRLs) would become the contractor's responsibility. The evaluation and review 
of proposals, engineering and design studies, and requests for waivers or deviations to 
contract requirements would be handled by the PM. Reviews conducted by Government 
employees familiar with a contractor's facilities, capabilities, and personnel would not be 
performed. 
The contractor would have maximum freedom in developing and 
implementing his work plan. The only internal management systems required would be 
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those detennined necessary by the contractor. The contractor would be free to pursue any 
subcontract or supplier relationship deemed most suitable, whether competitive or non-
competitive. The contractor would be solely responsible for tracking work progress, 
conducting testing and accounting for Government property. The contractor would also 
be responsible for monitoring his firm's internal and external operating environment and 
advising the Government of any changes that would adversely affect contract 
performance. For example, the firm's general financial health and current financial status 
of the contract (incurred costs, ahead or behind schedule) would be known only by the 
contractor. The sole responsibility for identifying the problem, and for solving it, r~mains 
with the contractor. Also, the Government would rely solely on the contractor's input for 
any labor disputes or collective bargaining agreements that may impact performance. 
The lack of interaction between the Government and contractor in this 
model would greatly reduce the number of functions to be performed during contract 
performance. The need for Review and Audit tasks would disappear completely, as would 
Monitoring and Surveillance functions. The only remaining function from the latter would 
be dealing with limitation of cost clause notification. This task would change from 
ensuring notification by the contractor to receiving notification from the contractor. 
The Report and Services tasks performed by the Government for the 
contractor would still need to be provided. Issuing duty-free certificates and assisting with 
Priorities and Allocations ratings would require Government action. Formal decisions 
would be limited to acceptance of items and the redistribution or disposal of residual 
Government property. 
59 
Program Sensitive tasks would include receiving CDRLs and notices 
regarding the expenditure of funds. The Program would also continue to review 
contractor change proposals. The tasks in the category of Directions, Negotiations, and 
Agreements would be performed as in the Traditional Model. 
c. Advantages 
There are four major advantages to the Transactional Model. Two of the 
advantages directly affect the cost of acquisition. The other two are general benefits to 
the parties. In addition, they have cost advantages but also more broadly enhance contract 
performance. 
First, the Government will save money through reduced manpower 
requirements throughout the acquisition cycle. The pre-award manpower requirements 
would remain, but virtually the entire staff could be reassigned at award. The remaining 
program office staff would make routine actions, such as correcting administrative errors, 
processing payment requests, and accepting the end items. Negotiation of changes or 
major program performance issues could be supported on an as required basis from a 
matrix support organization. This support would be on an as required basis, and except 
for the most complex issues, would probably consist of part-time support. A flexible 
MOA would be required with appropriate metrics to ensure responsiveness to program 
needs. The functional area managers would be responsible for developing the policies and 
procedures used in supporting a program as well as the training and administrative support 
of matrix personnel. In those cases where .long term or full-time support is needed, the 
PM would provide input for personnel evaluations. 
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Another cost related advantage is the reduced manpower and 
documentation costs incurred by the contractor. The current system of audits and reviews 
forces many defense contractors to set up entire office structures to maintain and 
document Government approved business systems. Audits sometimes last for months, 
draining resources and diverting management attention from the actual work being 
accomplished. The Government would benefit from reduced contractor costs, assuming 
the savings are at least partially passed along to customers. 
A survey of successful program managers1 indicated that two main factors 
in success were PM and contractor flexibility and recognition that all development 
programs are different. [Ref 20] The ability to conduct trade-offs is facilitated by 
reducing the number of policy and process constraints that affect a decision by the PM. 
Disengagement would allow a greater degree of flexibility to the contractor in resolving 
critical program issues. The ability for a contractor to change a process to address issues 
resulting from unforeseen events without subjecting the change to Government audit, 
approval and review, makes it possible to rapidly adapt to technological change or 
management risk. 
Finally, competition for major weapon system contracts would drive 
contractor's to push the limits of technology and specialize in specific areas of integration. 
This consolidation of expertise would occur from the pre-award evaluation phase. 
Because the Government would lack the ability to monitor progress or assist in resolving 
1 Successful program managers were those military and contractor PMs whose programs had been successful in 
fulfilling mission requirements or delivery on time or ahead of schedule within cost targets. 
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trade-off~ and "unknown-unknowns", the evaluation and award phases would be much 
more rigorous. The ability to fix a less than optimal pre-award planning during post-
award administration would not be available. Contractor's past performance, integration 
experience, and their technical personnel will have a more significant influence on the 
selection process. 
d Disadvantages 
The Government could find it difficult to coordinate and ensure the 
interoperablity and supportability of the weapon system. This is particularly important 
since the Services rely heavily on a "system of systems" approach to force structure. The 
lack of input on trade-off decisions and reliance on the contractor's technical expertise and 
judgment may produce a system that performs correctly but does not adequately conform 
to the existing supply, maintenance, and support capabilities of the Service. The added 
value of reviews conducted by Government employees familiar with a contractor's 
facilities, capabilities and personnel would be lost without the in-plant presence. 
During design and development, the Government has little input into 
decisions made to resolve problems associated with "unknown-unknowns". This may lead 
to less than optimal trade-offs being made based upon the contractor's judgment without 
the benefit of Government guidance. If the problems begin to adversely affect cost and 
schedule, the Government may not have adequate information and analysis of the problem 
to make a decision on whether to allocate additional resources to the program or to 
terminate it. 
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Configuration of the item is the sole responsibility of the contractor. The 
Government's lack of knowledge concerning configuration may adversely affect 
interoperability and spares provisioning during the system life-cycle. 
The inability to observe contractor tests of items will make it difficult for 
the Government to identify potential design deficiencies. This will reduce the ability of the 
Government to allocate additional resources to more fully develop the technology. Actual 
performance cannot be estimated prior to delivery of the item. 
The Government will have lost the opportunity to pursue public policy 
goals. The ability to promote small business participation in defense work and 
competition in general is lost beyond the prime contractor level. The Government would 
no longer monitor the relationships established with subcontractors and suppliers, trusting 
the contractor to make the best business decisions in these areas. 
Some traditional cost control incentives will be difficult to use without an 
in-plant presence to monitor and evaluate contractor efforts. The lack of information 
regarding a contractor's cost structure and allocation could reduce the Government's 
ability to motivate the contractor to greater efficiency. This may also increase the 
likelihood that contractors will improperly or fraudulently allocate costs to the 
Government. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter has described the six categories of contract administration tasks 
developed by Sherman: Monitoring and Surveillance; Reports and Services; Reviews and 
Audits of Contractor Internal Systems; Formal Decisions and Actions; Directions, 
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Negotiat~ons, and Agreements; and Program Sensitive Functions. The underlying beliefs 
and circumstances which exist that motivate the Government to perform these tasks were· 
discussed. Four organizational models (Arsenal, Directive, Partnership, and 
Transactional), were developed to illustrate how the acquisition environment and beliefs 
about the values, goals and objectives of a contractor shape the methods used to 
accomplish contract administration tasks. The models presented represent points on a 
continuum from nationalization of industry to complete disengagement. Along the 
continuum, the focus of management shifts from the ability to monitor and control the 
other party (oversight), to gaining mutual understanding to promote successful attainment 
of each party's individual aims (insight). 
In the next chapter, the U. S. Marine Corps' Direct Reporting Program Manager 
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (DRPM AAA V) program will be examined. The 
organizational structure developed by the DRPM AAA V to manage the Program 
Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) phase of the acquisition will be described. An 
analysis of the decisions about program office structure and management will be made in 
light of the PM's goals and objectives as well as his beliefs about the contractor's goals 
and objectives. 
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V. DIR_ECT REPORTING PROGRAM MANAGER ADVANCED AMPHIDIOUS 
ASSAULT VEHICLE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will analyze the structure and organizational agreements created by 
the DRPM AAA V for performance of the PDRR phase contract with General Dynamics 
Amphibious Systems. A brief background of the AAA V program will be presented. The 
decisions regarding the structuring of the PMO and the agreements between Marine Corps 
Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) and DCMC Manassas will be described. An 
evaluation of the management decisions made by DRPM AAA V in comparison with the 
models developed previously will conclude the chapter. 
B. HISTORY OF THE ADVANCED AMPHIDIOUS ASSAULT VEHICLE 
During the late 1980s, the Navy and Marine Corps began developing new 
operational concepts for the employment of Naval Expeditionary Forces. These concepts, 
developed in response to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the increase in regional conflict 
and the use of military forces for operations other than war, were published in Department 
ofthe Navy's " ... From the Sea." [Ref. 23] P.art ofthe overall concept for employing 
Naval forces addressed projecting power ashore using the sea, air and land as a continuous 
maneuver space. The current Marine Corps Assault Amphibian Vehicle (AA V) is 
inadequate to execute the high speed maneuver envisioned in " ... From the Sea." [Ref. 23] 
The Marine Corps identified the need for a new assault amphibian that was capable of 
over-the-horizon operations and attaining a water speed of25 knots. [Ref. 24] During 
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the Con~ept Exploration phase, 13 alternatives were evaluated to meet the operational 
requirements. The Advanced Assault Amphibian Vehicle was determined to be the most 
effective means of meeting the requirements for speed, maneuverability and survivability. 
Two contractors, United Defense Limited Partnership and General Dynamics Land 
Systems, competed for award ofthe PDRR contract. [Ref 25] The PDRR prime contract 
was awarded to General Dynamics Land Systems in June 1996. 
The Government had included, in the Request For Proposals, the intent to use 
IPPD concepts and IPTs to plan and execute the program effort. Further, the Government 
required each offeror's proposal to include the establishment of a facility where the 
contractor and PMO could be collocated. To facilitate collocation with the Government 
PMO, General Dynamics formed a new division, General Dynamics Amphibious Systems, 
to perform the contract. They are currently collocated with the PMO in a facility in 
Woodbridge, Virginia. [Ref 26] 
C. ORGANIZATION OF PROGRAM OFFICE 
This section will describe the organizational structure of the PMO and the 
operating agreements with DCMC Manassas and MARCORSYSCOM. The rationale for 
use by key decision makers in developing these agreements will also be presented. 
1. Program Management Office Structure 
DRPM AAA V developed a large, highly projectized staff. The program office is 
structured around seven areas of responsibility: AAA V personnel variant, AAA V 
communications variant, engineering, logistics, operations, business and finance, and 
contract management.[Ref 27] The total organic staff totals 74 billets. Currently, 46 
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personn~l are on the staff. [Ref 3] The PCO and legal counsel are provided to DRPM 
AAA V from the MARCORSYSCOM support matrix. They are physically located in the 
PMO. The main reasons for taking this structural approach are: availability of matrix 
support, desire for strong central control of program functions, and the complexity of the 
subsystems and technology integration effort. [Ref 26] 
Some of the engineering and logistics effort of the PMO is being performed by 
contractors operating under Contracted Advisory and Assistance Services (CAAS). These 
contracts will be phased out as personnel are hired to fill the remaining 28 vacancies in the 
PMO. DRPM AAA V may continue to contract out some services. [Ref. 3] 
All of the program work is accomplished through IPTs. There are 23 IPTs, 
divided into four levels. The levels correspond roughly to the Work Breakdown 
Structure. The "A" level deals with major program and budget issues and consists of the 
Government and contractor PMs and level "B" team heads. Level "B" teams are 
responsible for system integration and production. They maintain control over trade-off 
issues. (e.g., determine which subsystem will be allocated additional weight.) Level "C" 
teams monitor and control discrete performance parameters of the vehicle, such as 
firepower or mobility. The level "C" items are then delegated down to the individual work 
package level, level "D". Some ad hoc IPTs have been formed to deal with tasks such as 
writing the risk management plan and developing the simulator development schedule. All 
IPTs are contractor-led with Government participation. Where appropriate, 
subcontractors and Government support contractors are also IPT members. One 
Government-only IPT is made up of the seven division heads. The PMO staff have 
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attended several IPT training sessions. The PST personnel, however, were unavailable for 
that training. [Ref 27] 
2. Organizational Agreements 
DRPM AAA V functions under two major operating agreements for personnel and 
other resource support necessary to manage the program. The first agreement is between 
MARCORSYSCOM and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research Development 
and Acquisition (ASN(RDA))[Ref 28]. ASN(RDA) is the required approval authority 
for this agreement because DRPM AAA V is under his operational control. The second 
agreement is between DRPM AAA V and DCMC Manassas. Currently, an informal 
agreement has been established to implement formation ofaPST[Ref 18]. Final 
agreement and approval of an MOA is expected in January 1997.[Ref 29] 
a. Marine Corps Systems Command Operating Agreement 
The Commander MARCORSYSCOM is the Head of the Contracting 
Activity. As such, he retains responsibility for ensuring compliance with applicable 
regulations and procedures. This function is fulfilled in their agreement to assist in 
development of acquisition planning, including assignment of a PCO and legal counsel. 
The eventual strategy for the AAA V program is to transition control to 
MARCORSYSCOM when: 
• Initial operational capability and production maturity and Stability have 
been achieved. 
• Design maturity and stability has been achieved( no Pre-Planned Product 
Improvement P3I or block upgrades involving developmental risk) 
• Program maturity and stability have been achieved (No outstanding 
Defense Acquisition Board/Marine Corps Program Decision 
Memorandums) [Ref 28]. 
68 
The decision to transfer program responsibility to MARCORSYSCOM will be made 
by the Milestone Decision Authority, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and 
Technology. To facilitate the eventual transfer of program responsibility, 
MARCORSYSCOM will continue to provide support and guidance for engineering 
policy, as well as standards and specifications to ensure compatibility with existing 
systems. 
The Deputy for Financial Management at the SYSCOM will develop the 
policies and procedures for financial management. He will also act as the administering 
and budget submission office for the program funds. DRPM AAA V retains 
reprogramming authority, within established guidelines. MARCORSYSCOM has review 
and administrative responsibility for accounting procedures, higher level reprogramming of 
funds, and compliance with anti-deficiency controls. [Ref 28] 
An Advanced Amphibious Assault Coordination Group (AAACG) was 
formed as part of the MOA. The group convenes on an as needed basis, to resolve issues 
concerning functional support and provide an information exchange on policy 
implementation and procedures. [Ref 28] Any issues that cannot be resolved by the 
AAACG are forwarded to the appropriate Department of the Navy or Marine Corps 
official. No metrics for evaluating the MOA were established. 
b. Defense Contract Management Command Operating Agreement 
DRPM AAA V and DCMC began planning for a PST in November of 
1995, seven months before award of the PDRR contract. The PMO began planning for 
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the use o_fDCMC support after receiving correspondence from the DCMC headquarters 
outlining their services available for use by a PM. DCMC Manassas was designated as the 
field office responsible for providing resources and negotiating an MOA [Ref 18]. 
An initial meeting was conducted between the PMO division heads and a 
Program Integrator from DCMC Manassas. This meeting was to educate the PM on the 
range of services available from DCMC and to begin identifying areas of required support 
[Ref 18]. The PMO staff identified the need for a software quality assurance 
representative, an industrial engineer, a mechanical engineer, an ACO, and support for the 
program's integrated logistics support effort. During this meeting, the PM stressed that 
all PST members would be fully integrated into the office and participate in IPTs. 
Because of uncertainty about the timing and level of support needed in some functional 
areas, a phased approach was used in developing the PST staffing [Ref 18]. 
The first phase of staffing the PST occurred in September/October 1996. 
The ACO, software specialist, mechanical engineer and general engineer were brought on 
board. The general engineer has been assigned on a temporary basis for logistics support. 
During phase two, a permanent replacement will be assigned. Phase two will be 
completed in December 1996 with the assignment of a procurement clerk, PI, and the 
permanent general engineer. The last phase is currently scheduled for February 1997 
when another mechanical engineer will join the PST. [Ref 29] The assignment of 
personnel has been slower than expected because DCMC Manassas has had to hire many 
of the support personnel or have them transferred from other DCMC field offices. 
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DRPM AAA V requested that they be actively involved in the selection of 
PST members. DCMC headquarters disapproved the request, believing that allowing the 
PM even limited input in hiring would detract from the "independence" ofDCMC 
personnel. [Ref 18] Informally the division heads from DRPM AAA V reviewed resumes 
to provide an assessment of an individual's suitability. DCMC also expressed concern 
about the participation of PST members on IPTs. The position taken by DCMC is that 
PST personnel should only participate to the extent that they provide explanation of 
contract requirements or identify issues for process improvement. [Ref 30] PSTs should 
not be involved presenting the PM or Marine Corps input on trade-off decisions or other 
program control issues. Their involvement in this area would make them active 
participants in those areas where they are chartered to provide independent assessments 
[Ref 11]. 
D. ANALYSIS 
The office structure and operating agreements developed by DRPM AAA V appear 
to maintain a traditional organizational structure, but superimpose some of the 
characteristics of the Partnership Model onto this structure. Integrating the PST into the 
program office and collocating with the contr_actor shifted many of the functions 
traditionally assigned to the CAO to the IPTs. This means that the PMO and the 
contractor have expanded responsibilities, especially in the area of monitoring work status 
as well as surveillance and evaluation of contractor management processes. The 
management and control of the program using the IPPD concepts has also changed the 
methods used to satisfy task requirements. The resulting PMO-CAO-Contractor team 
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structure represents an evolutionary step from the traditional model described in Chapter 
III toward the Partnership Model developed in Chapter IV. Figure 5.1 depicts the AAA V 













Control - Overstght Instght - Trust 
Figure 5.1 Contract Administration Continuum with AAA V Model 
Source: Developed by Researcher 
An important factor in the ability to move toward the Partnership Model was the 
willingness of the contractor to participate. General Dynamics was eager to expand their 
business into armored vehicles. At one time, they had produced a large number of these 
systems but had lost new systems developments to other contractors and had many of 
their older systems phased out of the Services' inventories. Another factor was that 
moving to a collocated site would enable them to move to a lower cost area, reducing 
their labor and overhead costs. These benefits for the company made them willing to 
accept the uncertainties associated with a closer, and potentially more intrusive, 
relationship with the Government through collocation, and shared databases. 
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1_. Program Office Structure 
The program office structure developed by the PM was driven by several factors. 
The use ofiPPD and IPTs to manage the program will require a large staff to provide 
participants to each of the 23 program IPTs. These IPTs meet on a daily or weekly basis, 
requiring a large time investment from the participants. The reliance on IPTs requires that 
all Government members have a clear understanding of the issues involved, the limits of 
their authority to make decisions, and a chain of command to raise issues that cannot be 
resolved at their level. Successful IPTs rely on the commitment of top management to the 
team approach to problem resolution and empowerment of participants. By maintaining a 
projectized PMO, the DRPM AAA V chose a structure that simplified the lines of 
communication and authority. 
The size and complexity of the integration effort required to develop the AAA V 
also contributed to the PMO structure. The AAA V is the only Acquisition Category I 
(ACAT I) program in the Marine Corps. Although much of the technology in the 
subsystems is non-developmental, the integration of these subsystems contains a moderate 
level of risk. The MARCORSYSCOM does not have the depth and breadth oftechnical 
expertise to provide full matrix support to DRPM AAA V and to support those programs 
for which it has operational responsibility. [Ref 3] 
Although the pure program structure avoids the need to coordinate with functional 
managers in a matrix and facilitates communication and the delegation of authority 
necessary for IPT to work, it has some severe disadvantages. First, the PM has had to 
expend a great deal of time and management effort to hire and train the personnel. 
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Currently, one-third of the billets in the office need to be filled. The individuals that 
eventually fill these vacancies will not have received the team training and will have to 
begin participating on teams that have already developed a unique group dynamic. The 
transition from support contractors to PMO personnel may disrupt the continuity of effort, 
potentially slowing some areas of work. A plan for recurring team training, working on 
real issues, will be necessary to mitigate this disadvantage. To address this problem, the 
contractor is required to sponsor recurring team training. The effectiveness of this 
approach has yet to be determined. Second, the potential for expending resources on 
underutilized personnel should be a major concern. Matching the current workload to the 
skills of the personnel currently available is difficult. The result is that some functional 
areas have hired all personnel required for the duration of the program phase, but do not 
yet have their full workload. Conversely, some areas have more current work than 
personnel available. This workload imbalance is currently being filled by CAAS 
contractors. The literature on program management organizations identifies this as the 
key weakness to pure program management. Continued use of CAAS would allow a level 
of flexibility that performing all the work in-house will not provide. 
2. Operating Agreement with Marine Corps Systems Command 
In the areas of policy development and standardized procedures, the 
MARCORSYSCOM must continue to provide support to ensure a smooth transition of 
responsibility for the AAA V once it reaches full operational capability. Providing the PCO 
and legal counsel to the PMO preserves the ability of these key personnel to provide 
candid, unbiased opinions on program planning and execution because they continue to be 
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evaluated by the functional managers in the matrix. Collocating the PCO and lawyer with 
the PMO does, however, make it more difficult for them to take advantage of the 
expertise available from others in their functional areas. 
Collocation also isolates the PCO and counsel from the functional managers to 
whom they report. This produces an environment where they may not feel free to provide 
unbiased advice. The MOA with MARCORSYSCOM does not address evaluation 
criteria or performance measures for the support personnel and services they provide. 
This could exacerbate the feelings of isolation and lack of functional manager's support 
when unpopular decisions are made. 
The establishment of the AAACG is a positive step in providing a forum to resolve 
support issues and continuously exchange program information. The lack of any 
performance evaluation measures reduces the effectiveness of this arrangement. Currently 
no measure of responsiveness of the financial or engineering support activities in 
performing their functions exists. Because of the absence of performance metrics, there 
appears to be no shared vision of success or teamwork. As a result, the implementation of 
policies and procedures for managing and funding the AAA V program may lack the 
flexibility needed for success. The lack of teamwork will also make the eventual transition 
of the program more difficult. 
3. Operating Agreement with Defense Contract Management Command 
In the ideal form. of the Partnership Model developed in Chapter IV, a separate 
CAO organization would not exist. DCMC represents a tremendous source of technical 
expertise, especially in the area of measuring work performance. DRPM AAA V believed 
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that, in the area of software engineering, DCMC had the best available personnel to 
measure performance, anticipate problems, and provide sound input on development 
processes. In the case ofDRPM AAA V, the objective is to negotiate an MOA that 
provides for a seamless relationship between the organizations. The need ofDCMC to 
remain "independent" for its role in providing assessments to DoD is a major barrier to 
this goal. These issues have not yet been fully addressed due to the time required to staff 
the PST. 
The formation of the PST by DCMC Manassas has taken longer to develop and 
staff than was originally expected. This has led to some skepticism regarding their 
potential value to the PMO. A major contributing factor to the delay in staffing was the 
shortage of available personnel in DCMC. The downsizing of defense and the 
restructuring of the industrial base has made it difficult for DCMC to have the right people 
in the right place at the right time, as contractors consolidate and relocate operations to 
less expensive regions. DCMC's marketing efforts may have produced unrealistically high 
expectations by the PM of the availability of support under these. conditions. 
DCMC personnel missed early opportunities to participate in team training and 
initial team meetings because of the time required to assemble the PST. This will make it 
more difficult for them to adapt to the teaming environment. It may take a substantial 
amount of time for them to attain the same level of program specific knowledge, 
undermining their decision-making capability and credibility within the team. 
The PI position should have been the first position filled. This would have opened 
communications regarding the integration of functional area team members. Also as 
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delays in_filling positions occurred, the PI would have been there to reinforce DCMC's 
commitment to program success. Having the PI arrive near the end of team integration 
will also make it more difficult for him to coordinate efforts of individual team members 
and effectively establish an operating agreement. Another area that has not yet been 
sufficiently adqressed is the membership of the PI on IPTs. As the leader and coordinator 
of PST effort and the focal point for program assessments sent to DCMC, the PI needs to 
be a participant in the management level decision process. 
The method used to develop the PST could have been improved. The initial 
planning meeting was performed before DCMC Manassas had fully reviewed the PDRR 
Request For Proposal. Further, the approach of having the PMO staff identify resources 
by job title (e.g., mechanical engineer) focused attention on billet vacancies instead of 
customer needs. The identification of billets, and a commitment by DCMC to fill them, 
has been made without a clear idea of what tasks need to be accomplished. Each PST 
member assigned is now responsible for coordinating with the appropriate PMO division 
head to define the work requirements and performance measures. A great deal of time 
and expense will have been wasted if the division head determines, through consultation 
with the PST member, that their expectations.cannot be met. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter has described the background for the AAA V program and the current 
organizational structure of the PMO. Additionally, the background and methods used to 
develop operating agreements with MARCORSYSCOM and DCMC Manassas were 
discussed. Finally, an analysis of the management decisions and development process was 
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made to tdentify strengths and weaknesses. The next chapter will present the conclusions 
and recommendations developed from this study. Follow-on areas of research will also be 
outlined. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This study has developed a continuum of organizations and relationships that may 
be used to manage contract performance. The organizations developed and methods used 
are based upon several factors. The complexity of the weapon system being developed, 
the duration of the contract performance period, and the willingness and ability of the 
contractor to team with the Government will influence the methods used to monitor and 
control performance. The contractor must be evaluated not only on the compatibility of 
his culture to a teaming environment, but on his management capability and willingness to 
share data as well. The reform initiatives currently being pursued by DoD encourage the 
Services to move toward the teaming arrangements. This will cause a redefinition of the 
tasks required to monitor and control performance and should also shift that responsibility 
from the CAO to the PMO and contractor. Some contract administration functions will 
continue to be most effectively accomplished by a separate organization (e.g., negotiation 
of overhead rates). The need to maintain a separate contract administration organization 
will require operating agreements between the Government organizations regarding the 
Government-contractor team. The challeng~ will be to construct an agreement that leads 
to seamless execution of Government contract administration tasks. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Conclusion #1 
There is no consensus among acquisition professionals regarding contract 
administration tasks. The tasks developed by the researcher in Chapter III were compiled 
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from various publications and interviews. The individuals interviewed often had differing 
views on what tasks were necessary The most striking difference was in the perception of 
required tasks between PMs and contracting personnel.. 
2. Conclusion #2 
The overlap of organizational responsibility in performing contract administration 
make it difficult to clearly define contract administration tasks. The overarching 
responsibilities of the organizations performing contract management functions determine 
the methods used to accomplish tasks. This often leads to miscommunication between 
Government organizations in monitoring and controlling contractor efforts. 
3. Conclusion #3 
A spectrum of contract administration organizations exists. As discussed in 
Chapter IV, the assumptions made about a contractor's values, goals, and objectives affect 
the organizational relationships developed by the Government to manage and control 
contract performance. The current trend in DoD, under acquisition reform, is toward 
forming partnerships with industry. This will require a movement along the organizational 
spectrum to those models relying on trust and teamwork. 
4. Conclusion #4 
The AAA V Program Office structure represents an evolutionary step toward the 
Partnership Model. The AAA V PMO, as discussed in Chapter V, has taken steps to 
develop a partnership with General Dynamics Amphibious Systems through collocation 
and IPT training. The team approach is further advanced by including CAO personnel in 
Program IPTs. 
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5.. Conclusion #5 
The DCMC Program Integrator is not included in the AAA V Program 
Management IPT. As discussed in Chapter II, the PI is the focal point for interaction 
between the PMO and DCMC. Excluding the PI from the top level IPT deprives the PM 
of valuable insight into the resources available from DCMC to assist in resolving program 
issues. 
6. Conclusion #6 
There are currently no metrics for evaluating PST members' performance on IPTs. 
As discussed in Chapter III, metrics used by DCMC and their customers have involved 
evaluation of specific technical/functional tasks. While technical proficiency is still 
important, the IPPD concepts used by DRPM AAA V place a premium on using technical 
skill to further team goals. 
7. Conclusion #7 
The MOAs developed between DRPM AAA V and MARCORSYSCOM should 
contain metrics. The current arrangement outlined in Chapter V highlights the perceived 
lack of support from MARCORSYSCOM because there are no effective performance 
measures. A lack of metrics also increases the feeling of isolation for 
MARCORSYSCOM support personnel collocated with the PMO. 
8. Conclusion #8 
Including the PST personnel on IPTs will make it difficult to maintain their role in 
providing "independent" assessments. Dispersion ofPST members throughout the PMO 
and close working relations with AAA V staff will diminish their perception of 
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independ~nce. Working on IPTs focused on program trade-offs may cause PST 
evaluations to be biased. 
9. Conclusion #9 
DCMC involvement in support of the AAA V program did not occur early in the 
planning phases. Opportunities to influence the solicitation and negotiation of the contract 
were lost. This lack of early involvement and coordination contributed to the delay in 
forming the PST. PST members were unavailable for early Government-only team 
training, adding to the difficulty in developing relationships. 
10. Conclusion #10 
The current structure of 23 IPTs is a large drain on program resources. Many of 
the PMO staff spend several hours per day in team meetings. This could lead to a rapid 
decline in functional expertise and opportunities to share information informally. The 
large number of teams may also present difficulty in coordination of effort by the PM. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Recommendation #1 
A Process Action Team should be chartered to develop a consensus on necessary 
contract administration tasks. This team could build upon the work of the Contract 
Administration Reform Process Action Team that reviewed specific areas and 
recommended changes to current practices. The new team should be chartered to identify 
and define those tasks that must be performed to ensure successful contract performance. 
Additionally, criteria for determining the appropriate delegation of responsibility for each 
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task could be developed. These criteria should be developed to encourage movement 
toward the Partnership Model of contract administration. 
2. Recommendation #2 
The Government should continue to pursue policy reforms and technological 
innovations that encourage the forming of partnering relationships with industry. These 
relationships would benefit the Government in developing large, complex systems over 
long periods of time. Data transfer technology, such as video-teleconferencing and the 
internet, would allow teaming to occur without the expense of collocating Government-
contractor teams. Policy reforms should focus on encouraging more contractor 
innovation and flexibility in resolving program issues. This would reduce costs as well as 
acquisition cycle time. 
3. Recommendation #3 
The Program Integrator should be included in the Government's Program 
Management IPT. The PI is the focal point for all reports from the functional specialists 
on the IPT. Additionally, the PI is responsible for the program assessments provided by 
DCMC for DoD. The value of these assessments and the opportunity to address specific 
issues before they have a negative impact on the assessments will not be fully realized if 
the PI is not included in the highest level IPTs. Because of the PI's unique position to 
communicate with PST personnel on the 'C' and 'D' level IPTs, he can provide valuable 
insight to the Government and contractor PMs on how well information is flowing 
between the different tier IPTs. A full understanding of the context of higher level 
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decisions. will ensure more accurate assessments, clearer communication between IPTs, 
and a more proactive approach to resolving program issues. 
4. Recommendation #4 
The metrics developed in the MOA between DRPM AAA V and DCMC Manassas 
should focus primarily on participation in IPTs. The PM lacks the ability to control PST 
personnel because he exercises little influence over performance evaluations, training, and 
awards over PST personnel. The coordination of metrics with DCMC would ensure that 
PST personnel were recognized and rewarded for pursuing the PM' s goals through 
teamwork and innovative use of their technical expertise in resolving issues. Although the 
technical proficiency of each PST member would continue to be important, it would be 
subordinated to their ability to seek innovative solutions to issues, 
To address concerns regarding the integrity of "independent" assessments, the 
MOA should clearly establish the PM' s role. All assessments should be reviewed by the 
PM or his representative prior to forwarding to DCMC. The PM' s concurrence or non-
concurrence with the substance of the report should be noted. The PM should not have 
influence over the drafting of the report or its submission. Metrics in the MOA should 
avoid any evaluation input on personnel that would affect the objectivity of the report. 
5. Recommendation #5 
The milestone decision authority. upon designating a new major acquisition 
program. should require early coordination between the PM and DCMC. The early 
involvement ofDCMC at all management levels is necessary. Early coordination will 
allow input on pre-award decisions that affect contract administration. Often a long lead 
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time may _be necessary for the appropriate DCMC office to identify the resources required 
and ensure their timely availability. The AAA V program was not able to put together the 
Government team before establishing IPTs with the contractor. This situation has led to a 
catch-up period while new members gain background knowledge about the program and 
learn to work in their teams. The AAA V program might have avoided these problems 
with earlier DCMC involvement. 
6. Recommendation #6 
DRPM AAA V and DCMC should agree to frequent review of the MOA to 
develop a seamless relationship between organizations. The main issues in creating the 
MOA are: control of PST personnel, delegation of authority to PST personnel, and 
DCMC's function of independent assessment. DCMC's position on maintaining control 
and limiting participation of PST members in programmatic decisions to preserve their 
independence appear to conflict with DRPM AAA V's need for full participation of the 
PST's technical experts. The agreement that will satisfy both parties needs will evolve 
over time. A recurring process of review will aid in formalizing the agreement as it 
evolves. 
7. Recommendation #7 
DRPM AAA V and the contractor should review the IPT structure to determine 
ways to reduce the number ofiPTs required. Fewer IPTs would increase the quality of 
participation by their members. Because of fewer meetings required, functional area 
experts would have more time to spend exchanging information with other experts in their 
field. They could then bring this information to their meetings. Also, as lower level IPTs 
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are eliminated, this allows the higher level IPTs to better coordinate the work of those 
remaining. 
8. Recommendation #8 
DRPM AAA V will need a continuous deliberate effort to create a teamwork 
culture with the contractor. As noted in the study, cultural change is difficult to achieve in 
the short term, but is vital to the success ofiPTs. The new organizational arrangement 
between Government entities may lead to feelings of fear and isolation on the part of team 
members. Clear policy statements and visible reinforcement of team values will restore the 
confidence of those matrix support and PST members of the team. The more difficult 
change will be in overcoming the long term distrust that has developed between 
Government and industry. Time and clear policy, with appropriate rewards for team 
performance, will break down barriers to communication and trust. 
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This section will discuss the primary and subsidiary research questions posed for 
this study in Chapter I. Although the incomplete nature of the agreement between DCMC 
and DRPM AAA V limits the assessments that can be made in some areas, most of the 
questions can be answered fully. 
1. Primary Research Question 
Can a general model for implementing a Defense Contract Management Command 
structure into a program management office be developed from an analysis of the 
management decisions made in developing the Advanced Assault Amphibian Vehicle 
Program Management Office? 
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Although each program is unique, some_key criteria for assessing the desirability 
and effectiveness ofPMO-CAO integration can be identified. A single organization for 
program control and contract administration may not be practical. Some of the functions 
performed by a CAO that apply to many contracts cannot efficiently be addressed in a 
program's IPT structure. These tasks (e.g., negotiating overhead rates) would need to be 
developed outside the program structure. Full integration of a DCMC structure would 
also eliminate their ability to provide an "independent" assessment of the program since, in 
the IPT organization, they would no longer be independent. 
The functional expertise and knowledge of contractors and systems give DCMC 
tremendous potential to support PMs in an IPT environment. The CAO personnel 
experienced in cross-functional teams for PROCAS implementation should be especially 
adaptable to participation in program IPTs. 
2. Subsidiary Questions 
a. Subsidiary Question # 1 
What were DRPM AAA V' s principal objectives in developing the Program 
Management Office team. and to what extent were they achieved? 
The principal objectives of the PM in developing the AAA V PMO were 
to plan, execute, and control the contract performance through the use ofiPTs. The PM 
planned to request support from DCMC in software engineering and administration of the 
contract. The PM believed that it would be impractical to have the PCO perform the 
functions normally accomplished by an ACO. The PM was also convinced that DCMC 
possessed the best available personnel for assessing performance and measuring quality of 
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software_development. Additional requirements were determined based upon the initial 
PST planning meeting. The phased approach to staffing the PST and resulting delay in 
negotiating an MOA, make it impossible to predict whether or not the PM' s objectives for 
obtaining the required support will be achieved. 
b. Subsidiary Question #2 
How were Integrated Product Team concepts incorporated into the 
development of the integrated Program Office team? 
The plan for the Government's role in contract performance was to interact 
with the contractor through IPTs. To begin successful implementation of teams, DRPM 
AAA V arranged for several training seminars for the PMO staff The contractor is 
required, as part of the PDRR contract, to establish a training program for all IPTs. The 
teaming concepts used by DCMC in their PROCAS concept should enable PST personnel 
to adapt to the program IPT environment. 
The requirement for the PMO to collocate with the contractor was a key to 
incorporating teaming concepts. The PM feels that collocation is the major step necessary 
to change the Government's view of the contractor's values, goals, and objectives. The 
close interpersonal working relationships wilLbreakdown negative stereotypes and 
facilitate the creation of a team culture. 
The requirements for shared databases and regularly scheduled team 
meetings are another main factor in creating an IPT environment. Enhanced 
communication regarding the complex technical issues and integration risk will be possible 
through the sharing of"real-time" information among all team members. 
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c. Subsidiary Question #3 
What obstacles had to be addressed and overcome in developing the 
Program Office team? 
The two major obstacles to developing the PMO team were the time delay 
between the identification of resource requirements and actually forming the PST and the 
negotiation of roles for PST members to preserve their "independent" assessment 
function. 
The delay in organizing the PST was the result of the personnel staffing procedures at 
DCMC. The first source of functional specialists was from DCMC offices which were 
experiencing declining workloads. This delayed work assignments while personnel willing 
to relocate were reassigned ·and others were hired. This problem could have been 
alleviated somewhat by earlier involvement ofDCMC in program planning. The 
independence of PST personnel was addressed during initial discussions with DCMC 
Manassas. Because negotiation of a MOA is still ongoing, this issue has not been fully 
addressed. 
d Subsidiary Question #4 
What unique participation ofDCMC resources were necessarv in 
developing this Program Office team structure and what advantages and disadvantages did 
this have? 
The close working relationship between PMO staff and PST involvement 
on IPTs have several unique aspects. Usually the coordination of action and 
communication between PMO and CAO personnel would be accomplished during plant 
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visits or Qy phone and letter. The ability to meet face-to-face on a daily basis will enhance 
understanding. The PST personnel on IPTs often are the Government's only 
representatives. The authority they have to act for the PM, a key element of IPT 
participation, has not yet been fully defined. The final MOA will include a clear 
delineation of the PST members' responsibility. Their ability to act must be balanced 
against their role of providing program assessments. 
The main advantage of the PST's participation in IPTs and collocation with the 
PMO functional staff is the depth of knowledge in applying technical expertise to the 
development and evaluation of contractor systems and processes. Their participation on 
IPTs increases the Government's confidence that critical processes and methods of 
evaluating data are adequate to program needs. PST personnel will also be available 
within the functional specialties to provide a greater breadth and depth of experience to 
the PMO staff. 
A key disadvantage is that the PST personnel may potentially be isolated from the 
innovations and changes in conducting contract administration tasks developed in other 
DCMC field offices. In the worst case, the feeling of isolation from DCMC may affect 
their ability to provide unbiased program assessments. 
e. Subsidiary Question #5 
What unique organizational agreements were necessary to aid 
development? 
A key to developing the agreement between DCMC Manassas and DRPM 
AAA V was the DCMC Commanders commitment to fully support the Department of the 
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Navy's p9licy regarding collocation ofPMO staff in contractor facilities. Top level 
agreement by both DCMC and the Department of the Navy that the potential benefits of 
collocation and cooperation far exceed the potential for conflict between the PMO and 
DCMC. This agreement will allow the PMO and local field office to develop a flexible 
MOA that will evolve with the program. 
Because of the phased approach used to staff the PST, some DCMC personnel will 
have been involved in IPTs for several months. This arrangement provides the 
opportunity for each specialist on the PST to gain an understanding of the PM's 
expectations. The resulting agreement should, therefore, be designed to provide more 
detailed criteria for evaluation of support and clearly defined roles. 
f. Subsidiary Question #6 
What decisions and resources will be required to sustain the Program 
Officeteaminthelongterm? 
The sustainment of a successful team effort in the future will depend upon 
three key areas: continuous training of teams, identification and removal of barriers to 
coordinated actions between DRPM AAA V and DCMC Manassas, and early involvement 
by all parties in identifying changing resource requirements as the program moves through 
each acquisition phase. The contractor is required to provide recurring IPT training; the 
PM will need to ensure that new staff members are provided with initial training. 
Continuous evaluation of the efforts produced by the team will be necessary to determine 
the need for remedial training. The "independent" role ofDCMC personnel will require a 
balance between their ability to represent the PM in IPTs and their ability to provide an 
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unbiased _program assessment to DoD. Finding innovative ways to coordinate these 
diverse missions will require a detailed MOA and periodic reviews of the agreement to 
make necessary adjustments. The follow-on phases of the AAA V program will require 
most of the actual work to be performed at a separate site from the current facility. Early 
identification of the location of the new facility and the types of specialists required will be 
necessary to provide adequate lead time for hiring personnel and conducting training in 
IPPD concepts. 
g. Subsidiary Question #7 
How will understanding the development of the AAA V PMO be used in 
organizing future weapon system program offices? 
The DCMC can provide a great deal of experience and technical expertise 
to assist PMs in monitoring and controlling programs. The personnel that can be assigned, 
in the form of a PST, often have experience in working in a team environment with 
contractors through PROCAS. To take full advantage ofDCMC capabilities, early 
coordination and planning are essential. DCMC's mission of world wide contract 
administration support often requires a great deal of time to identify and allocate resources 
for optimal program support. Further, the PM needs to understand DCMC's 
"independent" role and promote an environment within the Government team that 
encourages confronting and resolving negative program issues. 
E. AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
During this study, the researcher found several areas that warrant further research: 
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- _There is a wide variety of perception by practitioners in the contracting field 
regarding contract administration tasks and assignment of responsibility. The contracting 
profession would benefit from the development of a contract administration taxonomy. 
- Independence of the organizations involved in contract administration can be a 
barrier to their integration into program IPTs. A key research question is: Can 
Overarching and Working level IPTs described by DoD fulfill the oversight and control 
objectives requiring independent assessment? 
- Many acquisition reforms have been motivated by a desire to reduce the cost of 
procurement by reducing cycle time and reducing the levels of oversight and regulation 
imposed on contractors. A study to determine if the use ofiPPD and IPTs has produced a 





Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) TENETS:. 
IPPD is an expansion of concurrent engineering utilizing a systematic approach to the 
integrated, concurrent development of a product and its associated manufacturing and 
sustainment processes to satisfy customer needs. 
IPPD Defined: A management process that integrates all activities from product concept 
through production/field support, using a multi-functional team, to simultaneously 
optimize the product and its manufacturing and sustainment processes to meet cost and 
performance objectives. Its key tenets are as follows: 
1. Customer Focus-- The primary objective ofiPPD is to satisfy the customer's 
needs better, faster and at less cost. The customer's needs should determine the nature of 
the product and its associated processes. 
2. Concurrent Development of Products and Processes-- Processes should be 
developed concurrently with the products which they support. It is critical that the 
processes used to manage, develop, manufacture, verify, test, deploy, operate, support, 
train people, and eventually dispose of the product be considered during product 
development. Product and process design and performance should be kept in balance. 
3. Early and Continuous Life Cycle Planning -- Planning for a product and its 
processes should begin early in the science & technology phase (especially advanced 
development) and extend throughout a product's life cycle. Early life cycle planning, 
which includes customers, functions and suppliers, lays a solid foundation for the various 
phases of a product and its processes. Key program events should be defined so that 
resources can be applied and the impact of resource constraints can be better understood 
and managed. 
4. Maximize Flexibility for Optimization and Use of Contractor Unique Approaches-
-Requests for Proposals (RFP's) and contracts should provide maximum flexibility for 
optimization and use of contractor unique processes and commercial specifications, 
standards and practices. 
5. Encourage Robust Design and Improved Process Capability -- Encourage use of 
advanced design and manufacturing techniques that promote achieving quality through 
design, products with little sensitivity to variations in the manufacturing process (robust 
design) and focus on process capability and continuous process improvement. Utilize 
such tools as "Six-Sigma" process control and lean/agile manufacturing concepts to 
advantage. 
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6. ~vent-Driven Scheduling-- A scheduling framework should be established which 
relates program events to their associated accomplishments and accomplishment criteria. 
An event is considered complete only when the accomplishments associated with the event 
have been completed as measured by the accomplishment criteria. This event-driven 
scheduling reduces risk by ensuring that product and process maturity are incrementally 
demonstrated prior to beginning follow-on activities. 
7. Multidisciplinary Teamwork-- Multidisciplinary teamwork is essential to the 
integrated and concurrent development of a product and its processes. The right people at 
the right place at the right time are required to make timely decisions. T earn decisions 
should be based on the combined input of the entire team (e.g. engineering, 
manufacturing, test, logistics, financial management, contracting personnel) to include 
customers and suppliers. Each team member needs to understand their role and support 
the roles of the other members, as well as understand the constraints under which other 
team members operate. Communication within teams and between teams should be open 
with team success emphasized and rewarded. 
8. Empowerment-- Decisions should be driven to the lowest possible level 
commensurate with risk. Resources should be allocated at levels consistent with 
authority, responsibility, and the ability of the people. The team should be given the 
authority, responsibility, and resources to manage their product and its risk commensurate 
with the team's capabilities. The team should accept responsibility and be held 
accountable for the results of their effort. 
9. Seamless Management Tools-- A framework should be established which relates 
products and processes at all levels to demonstrate dependency and interrelationships. A 
single management system should be established that relates requirements, planning, 
resource allocation, execution and program tracking over the product's life cycle. This 
integrated approach helps ensure teams have all available information thereby enhancing 
team decision making at all levels. Capabilities should be proved to share technical and 
business information throughout the product life cycle through the use of acquisition and 
support databases and software tools for accessing, exchanging, and viewing information. 
10. Proactive Identification and Management of Risk-- Critical cost, schedule and 
technical parameters related to system characteristics should be identified from risk 
analyses and user requirements. Technical and business performance measurement plans, 
with appropriate metrics, should be developed and compared to best-in-class industry 
benchmarks to provide continuing verification of the degree of anticipated and actual 
achievement of technical and business parameters. 
Source: SECDEF Memo May 10, 1995 
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